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INTRODUCTION 
Counterfeit goods are everywhere.  In an age where 
counterfeiters sell knock-off1 designer bags and watches with 
impunity and society hardly recognizes the casual purchase of 
counterfeits as a moral wrongdoing,2 counterfeit goods—whether 
in the form of a trendy handbag or burned CD—serve as a 
prevalent thread in the weave of modern America’s cultural 
fabric.3  Why stop, then, at creating goods that add to culture, when 
culture itself can be counterfeited?  Factories in Asia produce rugs, 
dolls, and dream catchers—among other items—that are shipped to 
America as “authentic American Indian goods,” where retailers 
rapidly sell these ersatz wares to (usually) non-Indian consumers 
hungry for a piece of Indian4 culture.5 
Today’s counterfeit goods, which frequently come from 
overseas sources, are typically mass produced or are otherwise of a 
lower quality than “authentic” Indian goods, and thus can be sold 
less expensively.6  The high demand for Indian goods, fueled in 
part by the New Age movement and increased travel and 
consumerism in America in the 1970s and 1980s,7 results in the 
diversion of millions of dollars a year from Indian communities to 
counterfeiters, which in turn leads to increased poverty in Indian 
 
 1 This Note uses the words “knockoff,” “counterfeit,” “fake,” and other similar terms 
interchangeably.  The use of varying terms does not connote legal distinctions.  This Note 
employs all such phrases to refer to goods whose makers misrepresent the origin of their 
goods’ manufacture or production. 
 2 Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating the 
Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 789, 809–10 (2005). 
 3 See id. at 812–13. 
 4 This Note uses the term “Indian” to signify descendents of the indigenous peoples 
who were living in North America when Europeans first arrived.  The Note employs the 
term “Indian” for the purpose of retaining the terminology of the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act.  Readers should not construe the term, which this Note uses interchangeably with 
Native American and American Indian, as pejorative in any way. 
 5 See Jon Parsley, Comment, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An 
Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 489 
(1993). 
 6 See id. at 495. 
 7 See, e.g., William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Note, Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis 
of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2001); Parsley, 
supra note 5, at 489. 
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communities.8  The effect of these fakes is not only economic—the 
mere existence of cheap, counterfeit goods passed off as 
“authentic” is offensive to many Native Americans and Native 
American communities.9  Counterfeit products may misappropriate 
sacred symbols and practices; the products may be 
misrepresentative of the kind of product traditionally produced by 
a certain community or may be made with inappropriate materials 
or methods of production; the inferior quality of the fakes is simply 
insulting to artists and other Indians, who feel that the inferior 
quality mocks Indian culture and beliefs.10 
To ameliorate the harm that such counterfeits cause, Congress 
devised a solution: the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 (the 
“IACA,” the “Act,” or the “1990 Act”).11  Modeled after the 
Lanham Act,12 the IACA makes it a crime for non-Indians to sell 
goods in a manner that falsely suggests they are “Indian-made.”13  
The idea behind this prohibition is logical: a requirement 
mandating that retailers properly mark crafts made by non-Indians 
would prevent consumer deception, which in turn would improve 
consumer confidence and eradicate consumer confusion.14  There 
would be no more mistaken purchasing of fake goods by 
discriminating consumers.15  No money would be lost to fraudulent 
sellers and Indian nations could improve economically, leading to 
greater political and economic autonomy.16  The proper labeling of 
 
 8 See Parsley, supra note 5, at 495–96. 
 9 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020 n.52 (citing John Henry Merryman, Counterfeit 
Art, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 1, 34 (1992). 
 10 See id. at 1021–22. 
 11 Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662, 4662 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)). 
 12 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006).  The Lanham Act is the current federal 
trademark statute in America.  It is not the exclusive law governing trademarks in 
America, as both common law and state statutes offer trademark protection.  A trademark 
can be any word, phrase, symbol, design, smell, color, or product packaging (trade dress) 
used by a seller to identify its products or services to distinguish them from other 
products or services sold or provided by others.  For a discussion of trademark law and 
policies, see infra Part IV.B. 
 13 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000). 
 14 See Parsley, supra note 5, at 497. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See id. at 496. 
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fakes as such essentially would solve the problems of 
misappropriation and misrepresentation as well.17 
Not all people who identify themselves as “Indian,”18 however, 
celebrate such a “solution.”  In practice, this Act effectively makes 
Indianness a trademark, vesting the exclusive right to use the term 
“Indian” to those recognized as “Indian” under the Act.19  This 
includes only Indians recognized by federal or state governments 
as Indian, and artisans certified by tribes.20  The Act’s definition of 
“Indian” excludes many citizens who identify as Indian ethnically, 
racially or culturally.21  Such individuals are unable to represent 
their goods as “Indian-made” to consumers, or command a similar 
market price, without risking prosecution.22  They are therefore 
disadvantaged when made to compete with counterfeiters, who can 
sell more goods inexpensively.23 
The economic effects of this Act are supplemented by the 
implications that the Act has for such individuals’ cultural identity: 
many are outraged and offended by the Act’s definition of 
“Indian,” as they feel the Act’s strict demarcation of who “counts” 
as an Indian undercuts their sense of self, family, and tradition.24  
Such sentiments suggest that the Act’s definition of Indianness is 
imperfect in that it fails to protect many deserving artisans who fall 
into this Indian Gap25 from potential litigation.26  Thus, despite the 
 
 17 It is interesting to note that the Act does not entirely eliminate economic problems 
for Indian artisans.  Since the Act still permits the sale of fake goods as long as sellers do 
not hold such wares out as Indian-made, for undiscriminating consumers who are 
ambivalent as to the authenticity of their purchases, the initiative of the Act may be for 
naught, as fake goods will still compete with authentic Indian goods in the eyes of such 
consumers because of their attractively lower price points. 
 18 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1012–14. 
 19 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000). 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2000). 
 21 Authorities estimate that this group could include as many as seven million 
Americans.  See GAIL K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND 
CRAFTS ACT OF 1990, at 88 (1997). 
 22 18 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2000). 
 23 See Parsley, supra note 5, at 495. 
 24 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1033–36. 
 25 This Note employs this term to refer to Indians who do not qualify for enrollment but 
who are culturally, ethnically, racially or spiritually affiliated, and nevertheless consider 
themselves Indian. 
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noble intentions of the Act’s framers, the Act in effect punishes 
members of the same community it was created to protect.27 
The IACA, as demonstrated, is not without flaws.28  First, 
determining who is an Indian, and therefore able to seek protection 
under the IACA, is problematic.29  The Act’s definition of “Indian” 
is solely a political demarcation that is insufficient in that it fails to 
include individuals who deserve protection, but who instead are 
potentially liable as counterfeiters under the Act.  Secondly, it is 
likely that such a faulty classification system is both an under and 
over-inclusive filter for what consumers “really want” when 
buying Indian products. 
This Note addresses how this Act affects and fails to protect 
individuals who fall into the Indian Gap and consequently cannot 
qualify as legitimate Indian artists under the statute.  Specifically, 
this Note details how varying interpretations and understandings of 
this Act—both judicial and anthropological—fail to provide any 
realistic conception of how to alleviate the concerns arising from 
both the counterfeit Indian goods crisis and the creation of the 
IACA. 
Part I discusses background to the Act, including the enactment 
of its precursor, the Indian Arts and Craft Act of 1935 (the “1935 
Act”),30 in subsection A, and the legislation’s problematic 
definition of Indianness31 in subsection B.  Part II details the 
counterfeit Indian goods problem, while it also discusses varying 
legislative, judicial, and consumer understandings of the IACA as 
well as the goal it purports to accomplish.  Part III discusses the 
IACA’s cultural and economic implications.  Part IV discusses the 
problem of analogizing the IACA to trademark law, especially 
because of the IACA’s cultural implications, and suggests that 
 
 26 Similarly, out of fear of exposure to liability under the Act, museums which hold 
artifacts of Indian heritage have begun to close, because of uncertainty over whether the 
makers of artifacts labeled “Indian” would meet the Act’s definition. See Hapiuk, supra 
note 7, at 1011. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. at 1014. 
 29 See id. at 1012–13. 
 30 Ch. 748, 49 Stat. 891 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305b, 305c, 305e & 18 
U.S.C. § 1159 (2000)). 
 31 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(a) (2006). 
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lawmakers remain sensitive to such issues.  Part V concludes with 
a recommendation on how to tailor the act to realign consumer 
desire with artisan production in an effort to fulfill the Act’s 
intended purpose of preventing counterfeit goods from competing 
with authentic ones, but without depriving artisans the right to call 
themselves or their goods “Indian.” 
I. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF 1990 
A. In Need of Economic Aid: The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 
1935 
In the wake of the Meriam Report of 1928,32 which found the 
living conditions of Native Americans deplorable, a new reformed 
Indian policy took root in the 1930s, resulting in the creation of the 
Indian Arts and Craft Act and the establishment of the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Board (the “IACB” or the “Board”) in 1935.33  The 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935 (the “1935 Act”) intended to 
promote the economic well-being of American Indians through the 
protection and establishment of an authentic arts and crafts 
market.34  This Act also authorized the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Board to engage in market and technical research; recommend 
loans; refer complaints of counterfeiting to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; and administer a system of acquiring trademarks for 
Indians in order to ensure “genuineness and quality.”35 
The 1935 Act, a precursor to the 1990 Act, was the product of 
a changing philosophy on the policy for Indian treatment in 
 
 32 The U.S. Secretary of the Interior commissioned “The Problem of Indian 
Administration,” more commonly known as the “Meriam Report,” to study conditions of 
Indian communities forty years after the General Allotment Act failed to promote 
assimilation among Indian groups.  The first sentence of the report reads: “[a]n 
overwhelming majority of the Indians are poor, even extremely poor, and they are not 
adjusted to the economic and social system of the dominant white civilization.” The 
Miriam Report, http://www.skc.edu/netbook/09-IRA.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). 
 33 See WILLIAM THOMPSON, NATIVE AMERICAN ISSUES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 99 
(1996). 
 34 See id. 
 35 See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, ch. 748, § 2, 49 Stat. 891, 892 (current 
version at 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2000)). 
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America, from one of forced assimilation and allotment to one of 
self-sufficiency and autonomy.36  While the 1935 Act did include 
fines for misappropriating the Boards’ marks, the Board did not 
initiate a single case in the first 50 years of its existence.37 
B. Determining Indianness and the Indian Gap 
Definitions of Indians and Indian tribes in the United States are 
political determinations, bestowed by federal and state law based 
on rules of membership.38  Federal and state statutes determine 
which people and groups are part of a “quasi-sovereign 
relationship” with the U.S government and are eligible for various 
governmental programs.39  Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian 
Law explains that “[t]he term Indian may be used in an 
ethnological or in a legal sense . . . [but] the federal government is 
dealing with members or descendants of political entities, that is, 
Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular race.”40  Since tribal 
membership is the “essential” element in determining Indianness, 
“a person of complete Indian ancestry who has never had relations 
with any Indian tribe may be considered a non-Indian for some 
legal purposes.”41  Hence, the IACA determines whether a product 
is an “Indian product” based on whether the product’s maker is an 
 
 36 After efforts to “Americanize” the Indians through a system of land allotment and 
educational reforms failed, authorities turned to other methods in their effort to solve the 
“Indian Problem” of poverty, disease, and illiteracy.  After Franklin D. Roosevelt 
assumed the presidency, he installed Indian reformer John Collier as Commissioner of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  As part of the Indian New Deal, Collier promoted Indian 
mobility, property rights, tribal self-governance, and restoration of Indian cultural and 
religious heritage, in stark contrast to the policies of assimilation and allotment that had 
ruled the day prior to that time.  The cornerstone of Collier’s work, the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, abandoned the land allotment system and renewed Indian 
political and social structures, leading the way for the efforts of economic betterment 
posited by the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935. See ROBERT E. LESTER, A GUIDE TO 
THE MICROFILM EDITION OF NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE NEW DEAL: THE OFFICE FILES 
OF JOHN COLLIER, 1933–1945, at v (1994). 
 37 See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 16. 
 38 See generally id. at 32–38 (noting that the extent of Native American tribal 
sovereignty and its interplay with state and federal law have varied throughout the course 
of American history). 
 39 See id. at 4. 
 40 RENNARD STRICKLAND ET. AL., FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 19 (1982 ed.). 
 41 Id. 
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“Indian” using only the political measure of tribal enrollment, 
without regard to the individual’s sense of his ancestral past.42 
The problem with this narrow measure of Indianness is that 
political demarcation does not necessarily comport with 
perceptions of Indians by individuals who self-identify as Indian, 
Indian and non-Indian artisans, or consumers.  Gail Sheffield, who 
has written the seminal work on the IACA,43 elucidates, 
“[w]hereas the [IACA] speaks to an ethnic activity—the self-
identification of an artist in the promotion and sale of his or her 
work—enrollment in a tribe is a political act or status, although it 
may be simultaneously an ethnic act as well.”44 
The IACA only considers individuals who are members of 
federal or state recognized tribes, or who are certified as artisans 
by an Indian tribe, “Indian.”45  Such individuals are thus the only 
people who may label their goods as “Indian-made.”46  In essence, 
“[w]hen it comes to making and selling Indian arts and crafts, a 
non-enrolled Indian ceases to be Indian.”47 
Seeking enrollment for currently non-enrolled Indians, 
however, is not easy.  Both historically and today, the system of 
governmental recognition of Indian status and Indian tribes is 
fraught with problems of arbitrariness,48 policies of assimilation 
and termination,49 and logistical hurdles for Indian groups seeking 
recognition.50  Fraud perpetuated by people and groups hoping to 
claim land allotments likely causes further government distrust of 
claimed “lost” tribes.51  As such, the current system of tribal 
recognition places a heavy burden on any tribe applying for 
 
 42 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(a) (2006) (“Indian as applied to an individual means a person 
who is a member of an Indian tribe or for purposes of this part is certified by an Indian 
tribe as a non-member Indian artisan  . . . .”); 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(d)(1) (2006) (“The term 
‘Indian product’ means any art or craft product made by an Indian.”). 
 43 See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21. 
 44 Id. at 4. 
 45 25 C.F.R. § 309.2. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1012. 
 48 See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 56. 
 49 See id. at 60. 
 50 See id. at 61 (“Fairly or unfairly, the Branch of Acknowledgement and Research has 
been criticized for various alleged shortcomings.”). 
 51 See id. at 106. 
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governmental recognition to demonstrate its roots existed from 
“time immemorial.”52  Eligibility requirements for a tribe include 
proving: 
(1) that it has existed from historic times until the present 
on a continuous basis and that it has been identified as 
Indian by various outside sources; (2) that most of its 
members inhabit a community or specific locale and are 
descended from members of an Indian tribe that historically 
inhabited a certain area; and (3) that it has been 
continuously an autonomous entity exercising political 
authority over its members.53 
Furthermore, the tribe “cannot be composed principally of 
members of other tribes or of tribes that Congress has terminated 
or otherwise rejected for . . . federal relationship status.”54  
Because of these difficult burdens of proof and the expensive, 
lengthy and arduous application process, scholars estimate that 
only half of potentially eligible groups are actively pursuing tribal 
recognition.55 
When the government recognizes a tribe, the relationship 
between the two entities is one of one government to another, and 
the members of the tribe are “enrolled.”56  Each recognized tribe 
uses a system to establish identity usually based on blood quantum 
and/or descent.57  As part of a policy of tribal autonomy, the 
government grants individual tribes the authority to create their 
own rules of membership.58  The standards for tribal membership 
vary greatly between tribes.  To qualify as a Cherokee, for 
instance, one only needs to be able to trace an ancestor to someone 
on the Dawes roll.59  Other tribes require as much as one-fourth 
 
 52 See id. at 57. 
 53 Id. at 60–61. 
 54 Id. at 61 (explaining the requirements of 25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (1993)). 
 55 See id. at 61 (noting an estimate Frank W. Porter made in 1983). 
 56 See id. at 4–5. 
 57 Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at 
the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 277 (2000–01). 
 58 See id. at 307. 
 59 See id. at 310.  Congress created the General Allotment Act of 1887 in a twofold 
effort to assimilate Indians by turning them into farmers through allotting them pieces of 
land, and to free up surplus land for white settlers. Unsurprisingly, not every Indian 
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Indian blood.60  Differing tribal requirements can lead to obscure 
results.  Kay WalkingStick aptly notes: 
To be a tribal member of the Salish of Montana, for 
example, one must have been born on the Salish 
reservation.  In order to be a Hopi, one’s mother must be a 
Hopi tribal member.  This means that if your father is Hopi 
and your mother is Salish and you were born in Saint 
Louis, you cannot be a member of either tribe, even though 
you are a full-blooded Native American.61 
Further complications, such as changing governmental 
recognition practices throughout history, exacerbate the problem of 
including all the people Congress intended the IACA to help.62  
Authorities estimate that approximately one-third of all American 
Indian tribes and Alaskan Native villages are without federal 
recognition as Indian tribes as a direct result of U.S. governmental 
exertion of plenary power nullifying or refusing the terms of 
treaties, or unilaterally terminating or otherwise dissolving the 
sovereign rights of individual tribes.63  As a result, even if 
someone has the requisite tribal requirements, the hurdles involved 
in verifying it may prove prohibitively difficult or even impossible 
to overcome. 
Additionally, some Indians who could seek tribal recognition 
refuse to do so as a matter of principle.64  Political agendas, anger 
over past treatment of Indians by the U.S. government, or disgust 
 
signed up, and since the government was doling out goods, some of the people that did 
sign up were not in fact Indians. See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 106.  This lends 
credence to the notion that tribes who use a decent-based identification system related to 
recorded names on the Dawes Roll also include many non-Indians under their purview. 
See id. at 107. 
 60 See Brownell, supra note 57, at 309–10. 
 61 Kay WalkingStick, Democracy, Inc.: Kay WalkingStick on Indian Law, ARTFORUM, 
Nov. 1991, at 20, 20–21. 
 62 In 1953, the Eisenhower Administration used termination policies to terminate 
federal recognition of a number of tribes.  Not all of these tribes have been re-recognized 
to date, again placing clearly Indian citizens outside the scope of protection under the 
Indian Arts and Craft Act of 1990. See THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 119; Joanne Barker, 
Indian™ USA, 18 WICAZO SA REVIEW, Spring 2003, at 25, 50–51. 
 63 Barker, supra note 62, at 55. 
 64 See Dianna Hunt, Native Texans; Tribal Lawsuits Stake Claims to Most of Texas; An 
Indian? It Depends, HOUS. CHRON., June 26, 1994, at A11. 
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at the idea that a person must prove that he is what he already 
knows himself to be may motivate such a refusal.65  Kenneth Ryan, 
an Assiniboine in Montana, expressed this sentiment when he 
declared before a gathering of Indian leaders in Oklahoma in 1993 
that, “American Indians, horses, and dogs are the only warm-
blooded mammals in the world who have to carry papers to show 
who they are.”66 
Gail Sheffield argues that “[t]he political nature of tribal status 
is one step removed from considerations of ‘ethnicity’; reapply the 
political definitions to a sphere such as art and they are two steps 
removed, an arbitrary process that creates arbitrary effects.”67  
Employing such “arbitrary” and exclusive definitions produces 
some substantial risks: First, potential emotional repercussions 
exist for those excluded from governmental classification of an 
Indian if one’s sense of self does not comport with one’s political 
demarcation.  Second, there exists the practical and economic risk 
that the crafts produced by the class of individuals who can label 
their crafts as “Indian” under the IACA may not comport with the 
class of crafts (either over or under-exclusively) that consumers 
may want to purchase.68 
II. THE COUNTERFEIT INDIAN GOODS PROBLEM 
A. Hungry for a Piece of Indian Culture 
With growing consumerism and tourism, as well as the advent 
of the New Age movement and burgeoning interest in Native 
American art, the 1970s and 1980s became a time of exponential 
 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id. (Kenneth Ryan is also a college professor). 
 67 SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 5. 
 68 One should note that the IACA does grant authority to state and federally recognized 
tribes to certify artisans who are not able or do not want to enroll in the tribes. See 25 
C.F.R. § 309.2(a) (2006).  Sheffield notes that “it is not clear how the two powers, that of 
the sovereign right to determine membership and that of the statutory authority to certify 
nonmembers, will interact.” SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 49.  Such a system may solve 
some of the problems associated with defining Indianness that this Note outlines, but 
certification of an artisan nevertheless remains dependent on acceptance by a tribe rather 
than on an independent self-determination of Indianness. 
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growth for Indian arts and crafts from a small tourist market into a 
multi-million dollar industry.69  Sources estimated that in 1985 the 
industry garnered approximately $800 million a year in gross 
sales,70 while by 2000, the industry generated over $1 billion in 
sales.71 
The growth of consumer desire for Indian goods and the 
corresponding increase in supply of Indian art and commerce, 
however, were accompanied by the appearance of increasing 
amounts of counterfeit art on the market.72  Overseas factories 
manufacture much of this counterfeit art using inauthentic 
materials and procedures, thereby producing poorly-made 
products.73  Authorities estimate that more than half of the goods 
marketed as Indian in origin could be counterfeit, meaning that 
Native American artisans are losing over half a billion dollars a 
year at the hands of fraudulent sellers who sell their imitation 
goods as “the real thing.”74 
The problems that the presence of imitation art in the 
marketplace creates are (at least) four-fold.  First, fake crafts 
deprive Indian artisans and communities of much needed income 
and contribute to increased economic hardship in Indian 
communities.75  Imitation goods are in direct competition with 
Indian goods, as they can appear more desirable to consumers 
since they are usually cheaper and are accessible in a wide range of 
venues, such as hotel gift shops, roadside tourist stops, and 
powwows.76  This is especially problematic because the arts and 
 
 69 Parsley, supra note 5. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 1 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2123 
(citing John Shiffman, $1 Billion Industry Reeling as Faux Crafts Flood Market, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 8, 1998, at A2; James Brooke, American Indian Crafts Loose Native Edge 
as Foreign Fakes Flourish, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4, 1997, at 11). 
 72 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1017. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See The Implementation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990: Oversight 
Hearing on Pub. L. No. 101-644 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 23 
(2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 75 See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 1–2, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2123. 
 76 See generally, Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020 (noting that if counterfeit Native 
American goods result in lower prices for even authentic Native American goods, the 
presence of counterfeits in the market may help consumers more than it hurts them). 
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crafts industry is a huge source of income for Native American 
communities.77  For instance, approximately 85% of the population 
in the Zuni Pueblo claims arts and crafts sales as either primary or 
secondary sources of income, and assert it has become harder to 
sell their work, even when they price their wares at levels lower 
than those their goods commanded ten years ago.78  Sources 
further estimate that 37% of the Hopi Tribe’s working population 
is involved in the arts and crafts industry in some way.79 
Second, fake crafts contribute to cultural extinction by 
potentially pushing legitimate producers, and hence “authentic” 
goods, out of the market.80  If Indian artisans cannot afford to 
produce Indian crafts because of the fierce and unfair competition, 
tribal cultures and practices as a whole risk eventually dying out.81 
Third, fakes decrease consumer confidence in the Indian art 
industry.82  Imitation goods may be difficult to differentiate from 
authentic goods, resulting in consumers potentially purchasing 
counterfeit goods when they believe they are buying legitimate 
Indian crafts.  Consequently, if consumers doubt that what they are 
buying is genuine, this may lead to diminished sales among 
prospective buyers who are only interested in purchasing authentic 
goods.83 
Fourth, imitation crafts in the market are offensive or hurtful to 
Indians who are sensitive to the cultural associations many Indian 
goods carry with them.  While authentic Indian artisans handcraft 
their wares from quality materials that take time and skill to hone 
into finished products, manufacturers of fake goods frequently 
 
 77 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 74, at 23 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (noting that the 
Hopi tribe derives $11.2 million of income from its arts and crafts business). 
 78 Hearing, supra note 74, at 42 (statement of Tony Eriacho, Jr., Board Member, Indian 
Arts and Crafts Assoc.). 
 79 Hearing, supra note 74, at 23 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 80 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020.  Hapiuk, however, also notes that as long as 
drastic decreases in prices do not entirely eradicate legitimate producers from the market, 
lower prices may benefit consumers more than they hurt producers, by increasing 
consumer choices through providing cheaper substitute goods. Id. 
 81 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1021. 
 82 See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 2 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2124; 
Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020–21. 
 83 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020–21.  The increasing presence of counterfeits, 
however, may also simply drive consumers to become more educated before purchasing. 
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utilize inferior materials and methods of craftsmanship that are 
often culturally false or misleading, and devoid of the personal 
integrity of handcrafted items.84  The invasion of cut-rate 
imitations cheapens tribal culture, undermining entire communities 
and beliefs.85  More seriously, such creations may violate socially-
constructed norms and destroy the social order by blasphemously 
exposing and defiling sacred knowledge.86 
Jodie Bernstein, the Director of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, summed up these 
concerns: “[a]uthentic American Indian arts and crafts are prized 
for their beauty, originality, and workmanship . . . .  When 
counterfeit arts and crafts are sold as authentic, it not only hurts 
Tribes and individual artists, but the consumers who don’t get what 
they pay for.”87 
B. Legislative Reactions to the Counterfeit Indian Goods 
Problem: The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 
Congress enacted the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 in an 
Indian-focused effort to combat the problems of counterfeit Indian 
goods.88  The 1990 Act gave teeth to the 1935 Act by “creating a 
private cause of action that enabled injured plaintiffs—sellers of 
authentic Indian arts and crafts—to recover substantial damage 
awards from violators of the Act.”89  The Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act of 1990 is a truth-in-advertising law90 which states: “[i]t is 
unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell any good . . . in a 
manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian 
product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or 
 
 84 See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 2 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2123–
24; Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1022. 
 85 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1021. 
 86 Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 
198 (1998). 
 87 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, American Indian Arts and Crafts “Surf 
Day” (October 24, 2000) (on file with author), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/ 
10/indianart.htm. 
 88 See Parsley, supra note 5, at 487. 
 89 Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 90 Truth-in-Advertising laws are laws that bar advertisers from advertising products in 
an unfair or deceptive manner. See 25 C.F.R. § 309.7 (2006). 
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Indian arts and crafts organization, resident within the United 
States.”91  Individual violators of the IACA can face up to $1 
million in fines and up to fifteen years in prison for subsequent 
violations of this Act.92  To qualify for protection under this Act, a 
seller of goods labeled as Indian must be a federally or state 
recognized Indian, or recognized by a tribe as an Indian artisan.93 
At the hearing before the Committee on Indian Affairs, the 
creators of the Act—then-Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell, a former Native artisan himself, and then-Arizona 
Senator Jon Kyl—endorsed the legislation.94  The Senate also 
invited tribal leaders to testify on behalf of the pending law at this 
hearing.  Jacob H. Lonetree, President of the Ho-Chunk Nation, 
called the Act “vitally important to the protection of Indian artisans 
and crafts people,”95 and stated “[t]he Ho-Chunk Nation is proud 
of its collaboration with Native American Arts Inc. to pursue the 
enforcement of [the A]ct.”96  Clan elders of the Ho-Chunk Nation 
further elucidated the connection between the economic viability 
of Indian people and the preservation of Indian culture: “[t]hrough 
necessity and survival, the native people continue to make crafts 
for profit to feed their families, but in all of that, they still look to 
the Creator for inspiration and thank Him for the talent, the ideas, 
the colors, and the materials to make the Arts and Crafts.”97  
Through this explanation they expressed their firm support of the 
Act’s mission of trying to secure economic viability for Native 
American citizens. 
In November of 1996, the IACB released its final regulations 
in an effort to help solve ambiguities in interpreting the IACA.98  
While these regulations provided answers to some problems, such 
as the question of who qualifies for certification as an Indian 
 
 91 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000). 
 92 18 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2) (2000). 
 93 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1) (2000). 
 94 See Hearing, supra note 74, at 2 (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell); id. at 
22 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 95 Id. at 30 (testimony of Jacob H. Lonetree, President, Ho-Chunk Nation). 
 96 Id. at 31. 
 97 Id. at 109 (Written Testimony of Traditional Court (Clan Elders) of Ho-Chunk 
Nation). 
 98 See 25 C.F.R. §§ 309.1–.2, .6–.27 (2006). 
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artisan,99 they also raised additional concerns.  For example, the 
Final Regulations forbid the unqualified use of the designation 
“Native American,” in addition to the unqualified use of “Indian” 
that the statute itself forbids, but allow the use of “Indian-style” or 
“Native American-style.”100  Furthermore, the regulations fail to 
qualify the definition of “made” in terms of what constitutes 
“Indian-made,” and offer no guidance as to how much Indian labor 
must, or non-Indian labor may, play a part in the final product to 
qualify.101  The Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, 
billed as “[a]n Act [t]o improve the cause of action for 
misrepresentation of Indian arts and crafts”102 added additional 
amendments to clarify the language of the 1990 Act.103 
The revised Act made notable strides for Indian people by 
increasing civil penalties, creating new criminal charges to deter 
potential counterfeiters, and extending standing to sue under the 
Act to individuals and Indian tribes in addition to the government 
attorneys previously authorized to bring such actions.104  
Empowering independent parties to refer claims for investigation 
helps to expose a greater number of IACA violations,105 establishes 
greater social involvement in upholding the Act’s ideals,106 and 
reinforces notions of tribal sovereignty. 
Equally important is what the Act does not do: as a truth-in-
advertising law, the IACA seeks to limit only the way in which 
retailers market, advertise, and label goods for sale.107  Advertising 
 
 99 25 C.F.R. § 309.4(a) (2006) (limiting those who can be certified to people of Indian 
lineage). 
 100 25 C.F.R. § 309.3(a) (2006).  See infra Part II.D for a discussion of the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of this regulation. 
 101 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(d) (2006). 
 102 Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-497, § 1, 114 Stat. 
2219, 2219 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)). 
 103 Id. § 2, 114 Stat. 2219–20. 
 104 See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, ch. 748, § 6, 49 Stat. 891, 893 (current 
version at 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)). 
 105 Hearing, supra note 74, at 15–16 (statement of Faith Roessel, Chairperson, IACB, 
Dep’t of Interior). 
 106 The IACB has started a toll-free number, 1-888-ART-FAKE, that artists and 
consumers can use to file complaints or to obtain more information about fake art. See, 
e.g., Diana Marrero, Fakes Grow in Indian Art Market, Experts Say, SIOUX FALLS 
ARGUS-LEDGER, May 22, 2006, at A1. 
 107 See 25 C.F.R. §§ 309.7–.9 (2006). 
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methods may include brochures and print advertisements, labeling 
of individual goods, or any other commercial representation which 
is likely to confuse consumers as to whether Indians made the 
goods in question.108  The IACA does not limit creative expression 
of artists in designing their products.  The distinction between 
regulating advertising methods versus artists’ creative expression 
is relevant in determining the scope of protection afforded Indian 
artisans, as well as the constitutionality of the Act.109  In one of the 
first cases brought under the IACA, Native American Arts v. 
Village Originals,110 Village Originals, a nationwide operator of 
arts and crafts retail stores, challenged the IACA’s constitutional 
validity on First Amendment grounds.111  The court rejected 
Village Originals’ claim that the IACA regulated the content of its 
crafts by prohibiting it from utilizing “Southwest” designs which 
oftentimes resemble Native American designs.112  In a strong 
defense of the Act, the court noted “[t]o the contrary, IACA does 
not restrict the artistic quality of Village Originals’ merchandise.  
Rather, it merely regulates the means through which such 
merchandise is marketed.”113 
C. Implications for Consumers’ Expectations of “Authenticity” 
Since the IACA targets only the way artisans can label their 
goods, rather than the style used in the creation of the goods, the 
success of the Act in decreasing Indian poverty is reliant on 
consumers making the “right” choice between Indian and non-
 
 108 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000); 25 U.S.C. §305e(a) (2000). 
 109 See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880–81 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998). 
 110 25 F. Supp. 2d 876. 
 111 See id. at 880. 
 112 See id. at 880–81.  See also 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARK 
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[7][a] (2006 ed.) (“Courts have been wary about 
extending trademark law protection to copyrighted material in particular.  They appear to 
be suspicious of any overlap between trademark and copyright protection, not wanting to 
safeguard intellectual property under both schemes and speculating that plaintiffs may be 
benefiting unduly from double protection.  In fact, courts probably should be concerned 
about attempts to plead an essentially copyright-based claim as a Lanham Act claim, too, 
and look to the policies of both copyright and trademark law to ensure that one does not 
overwhelm the other.”). 
 113 Vill. Originals, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 880. 
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Indian goods.114  It is therefore imperative that any choice that 
consumers have between “Indian” and “non-Indian” products 
comports with consumer notions of what the terms “Indian” and 
“non-Indian” signify with respect to their purchase.  If the IACA’s 
scope is too broad, such that a consumer can still buy what is 
purportedly Indian and not get what he or she wants, consumers 
will not make purchasing choices based on the demarcations set 
out by the IACA.  Conversely, if the IACA’s scope is too narrow, 
consumers will either purchase goods produced by artisans falling 
outside the ambit of the Act—thereby defeating the Act’s 
purpose—or will unduly limit their search to products falling under 
the Act.  The repercussions of such an overly narrow scope would 
include decreasing revenue to some arguably deserving artisans as 
well as Indian communities at large—again defeating the purpose 
of the Act—restricting the pool of products available for purchase, 
and encouraging fetishism and increased notions of homogeneity 
among Indian groups. 
1. What is “Authenticity” Anyway? 
What are consumers seeking and what do they think they’re 
getting by “buying Indian”? How much of a role does the “Indian” 
element play in consumers’ decision to purchase goods?  Based on 
the large range of consumers—from serious art collectors, to 
hobbyists, “wannabe” Indians, New Age hippies, and tourists 
visiting Native American communities—there are undoubtedly 
varied answers to these questions.115  Scholars speculate that a 
general belief—whether misguided or not—that Indian societies 
are essentially spiritual and artistic in nature has fueled the 
increased consumer demand for Native American goods of the last 
few decades.116  Scholars maintain this belief fosters “[t]he current 
tendency [of consumers] to “put the ‘sacred,’ the ‘traditional’ the 
‘natural’ and ‘artistic’ at the heart of all Indian life [while 
overlooking] the commercial, the bureaucratic, the secular, the 
 
 114 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1055–56. 
 115 See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 88–93; Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1017. 
 116 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1022 (quoting BARRY M. PRITZKER, NATIVE AMERICA 
TODAY: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY POLITICS AND CULTURE 3 (1999). 
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inventive.”117  This tendency to define Indian life, and hence the 
arts and crafts created by Indians, as sacred or heavily imbued with 
cultural “authenticity” and meaning thus becomes a stand-alone 
quality of Indian goods, beyond whatever aesthetic or utilitarian 
function they otherwise possess.  Such romanticism, however,  
likely constitutes an overly simplistic view of the large Indian arts 
industry, for it is unmindful of the hurdles and basic market forces 
that all sellers face when trying to sell goods in a competitive 
marketplace. 
“Authenticity” itself is a slippery subject, especially when 
dealing with cultural creations.  Cultures are, by definition, ever 
changing and transforming over generations.118  Because of 
movements of people and changes in circumstance, the manner in 
which societies pass on cultural elements or practices can change 
both substantively, and in terms of the values and mores members 
of a culture employ to relate what and how they are thinking, 
practicing, performing and otherwise expressing themselves.  
Specifically in terms of creating art, where different artisans in a 
single community may employ divergent methods, materials, and 
rituals to produce the same type of good over many years, who is 
to say what the “authentic” way is?  Since divergent methods of 
production stem from the same vast and ancient “culture,” which 
member’s way is best?  At what time would one fix “authenticity”?  
A fixed conception of authenticity, which makes unrealistic 
presumptions regarding temporal change and concurrent variation, 
is at odds with the way societies evolve and transmit their cultures.  
There likely never was such a thing as one traditional way of 
fabricating Indian art.119  While some artisans do certainly draw on 
religious or cultural traditions to influence their work, they often 
combine such inspiration with western or non-symbolic influences 
as well.120  Like any group of suppliers that must tailor its products 
to the needs and desires of the market, the Indian arts and crafts 
 
 117 Richard White, Representing Indians, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1997, at 28, 33. 
 118 See Brown, supra note 86, at 197. 
 119 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1053–54. 
 120 See id. at 1054. 
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community has undoubtedly changed over time to reflect changing 
consumer preferences.121 
Furthermore, even if one could deduce a single method of 
production for an object at a specific moment in time, it makes 
little sense to freeze such an idea as the sole mode of expression.  
For one thing, this inhibits innovation moving forward.  Secondly, 
it fails to account for other “authentic” methods that existed in the 
past—or may arise in the future—and presents an incomplete view 
of a changing society.  Thirdly, the imposition of a rigid formula 
would actually make for less authentic products than untouched 
organic creation.  Such a regime would reduce the act of creation 
to the replication of a rote formula, rather than an act of processed 
inspiration.  As one scholar notes, the most effective means of 
“preserving” aspects of an indigenous group’s “culture” do not 
generally consist of “locking songs and stories in the strongbox of 
‘genuine tradition,’ but in the[] creative application of core cultural 
insights to solving the problems presented by evolving historical 
contexts.”122 
When considering the question of authenticity, it is also worth 
asking “authentic as opposed to what?”123  Authenticity is a 
concept “whose meaning remains uncertain until we know what 
dimension of its referent is being talked about.”124  Denis Dutton 
explains that “a forged painting, for example, will not be 
inauthentic in every respect: a Han van Meegeren forgery of a 
Vermeer is at one and the same time both a fake Vermeer and an 
authentic van Meegeren.”125  Dutton draws a further comparison 
between “nominal authenticity” and “expressive authenticity,” the 
former being simply a correct identification of the author, and the 
latter representing an object’s character as the true expression of an 
individual’s or a society’s values and beliefs.126  Dutton cautions 
purchasers against a strong “temptation to imagine that 
 
 121 See id. 
 122 Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 203, 236 (2003). 
 123 Denis Dutton, Authenticity in Art, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS 258, 
(Jerrold Levinson ed., 2003). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
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ascertaining nominal authenticity will inevitably favor some ‘old’ 
or ‘original’ object over a later artefact [sic].”127  Because the 
IACA allows only artisans who are politically recognized as 
“Indian” the right to market their creations as “Indian,” the Act 
speaks merely to nominal authenticity, rather than the expressive 
authenticity of the arts and crafts sold as Indian-made.128  This is 
problematic because it is likely that consumers are more interested 
in expressive authenticity than nominal authenticity when it comes 
to Indian goods. 
When a consumer expresses an interest in purchasing 
“authentic” Indian goods, whether a particular seller is recognized 
politically as Indian is likely neither necessary nor sufficient to 
convince such a buyer that the goods he sells are “authentic.”  
Rather, consumers likely view the criteria of “authenticity” as 
relating to immeasurable qualities of the goods such as the 
meaning imbued in a piece by its creator; the time, effort and 
quality of the materials invested in making a piece; the similarity 
of a good to ancient, ritual or traditional goods of the same type; or 
a sense that the artist somehow incorporated her Indian 
experiences and identity into her production of the good.129  By 
failing to take into account these relevant factors in consumers’ 
decisions to purchase Indian goods, the IACA draws an imperfect 
divide between what consumers desire and what the framers of the 
IACA want consumers to purchase.  Artists in the Indian Gap 
suffer in two ways: first, the IACA fails to account for them in its 
definition of “Indian”; second, they are passed up by consumers 
who do not realize that the “Indian” label on goods carries only a 
narrow legal and political definition and would otherwise purchase 
their goods. 
The IACA also fails to account for the nominal/expressive 
authenticity distinction in matters of intertribal fraud among 
governmentally recognized Indians.  In one documented incidence 
of intertribal misappropriation, members of the Hopi tribe accused 
Navajo manufacturers of creating fake Kachina dolls, Hopi figures 
 
 127 Id. 
 128 See 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000). 
 129 See Dutton, supra note 123, at 270. 
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with no basis in Navajo culture.130  The Navajo producers carved 
the dolls from balsa wood, though the Hopi traditionally make the 
dolls from cottonwood.131  Though the marketing and sales of such 
dolls as authentic Indian products is misrepresentative and 
misleading to consumers, under the current IACA, the Hopi 
artisans have no recourse against this type of behavior.132  Navajo 
producers are free to label such dolls “Indian-made,” since they are 
indeed Indians.  This loophole exemplifies why legislative reliance 
on political categorization alone is insufficient to cure the 
counterfeit Indian goods problem and to ensure that consumers get 
what they pay for. 
D. Judicial Interpretations: Prosecution under the IACA 
Despite the longtime existence of the Act, few parties have 
referred valid, actionable complaints to the IACB,133 and even 
fewer courts have imposed liability under the Act.134  Even more 
surprisingly, until 2005, none of these cases reached the appellate 
court level.135 
Native American Arts Inc., an Indian arts and crafts 
organization, brought the first case under the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act when it filed suit against J.C. Penney in May of 1998.136  
Another case brought that same year, Native American Arts Inc. v. 
Village Originals,137 was the first to recognize that the legislative 
history of the IACA indicated that the Act’s “falsely suggests” 
 
 130 Mark Shaffer & Bill Donovan, Hopi Kachina Doll Carvers Protest Navajo Replicas, 
N.O. TIMES-PICAYUNE , Jan. 30, 1994, at A12. 
 131 Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1074. 
 132 See id.  But see Richard A. Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American 
Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111, at 137–38 (1995–1996) (positing that the Hopi could 
bring a claim against the Navajo under the IACA). 
 133 See Hearing, supra note 74, at 16 (statement of Faith Roessel, Chairperson, IACB, 
Dep’t of Interior). 
 134 See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Chico Arts, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (both holding that Native American Arts did not have standing to sue under the 
IACA). 
 135 See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 136 See J.C. Penney, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
 137 25 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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clause should be construed as “parallel and analogous” to 15 
U.S.C. § 1125, a section of the Lanham Act.138 
An Indian Arts and Crafts Act violation is a separate and 
distinct claim from a Lanham Act violation.139  A violation of both, 
neither, or either is theoretically possible in any given 
circumstance.140  In situations involving potentially counterfeit 
Indian goods, for instance, plaintiffs have brought cases alleging 
only violations of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, and not the 
Lanham Act.141  In 2005 and 2006, however, judges ruling on the 
first two appellate court cases brought under the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act nevertheless couched their discussion of the IACA in 
Lanham Act terms,142 even though the plaintiffs in these two cases 
did not allege Lanham Act violations in the respective lower court 
proceedings.143  While these two cases were not the first to note the 
clear legislative intent to model the IACA’s use of  the phrase 
“falsely suggesting” after the Lanham Act,144 the analogous 
treatment these courts afford the two statutes is unprecedented.145  
While scholarly criticism and commentary surrounding the Act146 
 
 138 See id. at 881 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-400, pt. 1, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6390).  See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the policies that 
underlie governmental protection of commercial trademarks in the United States. 
 139 See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct., 133 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
 140 An imitation of a Silver Hand logo or another other IACB-certified trademark, for 
instance, would likely qualify for protection under both the Lanham Act and the IACA.  
Where there is no trademark infringement, but only a manner of advertising that is 
suggestive of goods being Indian-made, however, protection is only available under the 
IACA.  Of course, goods can also violate the Lanham Act’s “regular” trademark 
protections without deceptive advertising suggesting such wares are Indian-made. 
 141 See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc., v. Earth Dweller, Ltd., No. 01-C-2370, 2001 WL 
910394, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); J.C. Penney, 5 F. Supp. at 600. 
 142 See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 733–34 (7th Cir. 
2006); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873–74 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 143 See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 730–31; Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873. 
 144 See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (“House Report 101-400 (I) . . . . further stated that the ‘falsely suggests’ clause 
was intended to be construed as parallel and analogous to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-400, pt. 1, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6390)). 
 145 Compare id., with Hartford, 435 F.3d at 734 (noting that a violation of the IACA 
equates with a trademark violation), and Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873 (noting that the IACA 
“makes ‘Indian’ the trademark denoting products made by Indians”). 
 146 See infra Part III.A. 
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has for the most part been limited to the cultural implications of the 
legislation—who is and who is not allowed to call himself an 
Indian, and why this line is arbitrary147—these two cases, both of 
which the Seventh Circuit decided, shed light on how courts 
interpret and apply the Act from an economic standpoint.148  The 
existence of such divergent—or perhaps dovetailing—frameworks 
surrounding the same Act demonstrates how authorities must 
understand “Indianness” as both a powerful cultural quality and a 
potent economic asset, neither of which should be overlooked in 
thinking about and applying the IACA. 
1. Native American Arts, Inc. v. The Waldron Corporation149 
In 2001, Native American Arts, Inc. (“NAA”) sued Earth 
Dweller, Ltd. (“Earth Dweller”) for violations of the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Act of 1990 and the Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement 
Act of 2000, seeking punitive damages.150  NAA alleged that Earth 
Dweller fraudulently offered, displayed and sold goods labeled as 
“Indian” that were in truth not Indian-made.151  The district court 
refused a jury instruction sought by NAA regarding 25 C.F.R. § 
309.24(a),152 which provides that “the unqualified use of the term 
‘Indian’ or . . . of the name of an Indian tribe . . . in connection 
with an art or craft product is interpreted to mean . . . that . . . [t]he 
art or craft product is an Indian product.”153  The trial court 
 
 147 See generally SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 151 (“[The IACA] confuses or juxtaposes 
nonsimilar categories and treats them identically, with no recognition of the possible 
divergence of consequences.”); Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1014 (“[The IACA] is flawed 
because it fails to acknowledge the historical development of both Indian tribes and 
Indian arts and crafts and to appreciate fully the dialogical ways that contemporary Indian 
identity is construed.”); Parsley, supra note 5, at 488 (“Congress, in its attempt to help 
Native Americans, has actually stolen the heritage of some Indians and caused massive 
infighting among Native Americans residing in the United States”). 
 148 See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733–34; Waldron, 399 F.3d at 874. 
 149 399 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 150 Native Am. Arts, Inc., v. Earth Dweller, Ltd., No. 01-C-2370, 2001 WL 910394, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001). 
 151 Id. at *1. 
 152 Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873. 
 153 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a) (2006).  25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a) is one of the regulations that 
“define[s] the nature and Indian origin” of the goods the IACA protects “from false 
representations” and details how the IACB “interpret[s] certain conduct for enforcement 
purposes. 25 C.F.R. § 309.1 (2006). 
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reasoned that such a regulation was inconsistent with the plain 
language of the IACA,154 “too far reaching in its regulation of 
commercial speech,”155 and too vague to adequately instruct 
someone looking to follow the regulation how to “qualify” his or 
her use of the term “Indian.”156 
NAA took issue with the district court’s finding in favor of the 
defendants as well as the jury’s verdict and moved for a new trial, 
arguing that the district court erred in refusing the jury instructions 
NAA sought pertaining to 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a).157  When the 
district court denied NAA’s request for a new trial, NAA appealed 
to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.158  NAA argued 
that the district court should not have refused to base an instruction 
to the jury on the regulation on the grounds of the regulation’s 
unconstitutionality, because the court should not have found the 
regulation unconstitutional in the first place.159  NAA additionally 
disputed the validity of the district court’s ruling that the 
“unqualified use” regulation infringed upon freedom of speech and 
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.160 
The Seventh Circuit opinion, which Judge Posner wrote, 
immediately struck down the district court’s ruling that the 
regulation was unconstitutional, noting that if the district court 
judge was right, “trademark law would be unconstitutional.”161  
The opinion continued: “[i]n effect the regulation makes “Indian” 
the trademark denoting products made by Indians, just as 
‘Roquefort’ denotes a cheese manufactured from sheep’s milk 
 
 154 Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., No. 01 C 2370, 2004 WL 1687184 at *3 
(N.D. Ill. July 23, 2004).  Judge Deryeghiayan opined that because unqualified use of the 
word “Indian” would not in all cases “falsely suggest” to a consumer that a product was 
Indian-made, as the IACA requires for a violation, the differing standards of the IACA 
and the regulations the government employs the promulgate could mislead a jury. See id. 
 155 Id. at *4.  The court noted that “[d]efendant’s jewelry was thus artwork and was the 
end product of her expression of the various cultures that she learned about.  Such speech 
is protected even if the jewelry is eventually sold.” Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at *1. 
 158 Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
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cured in limestone caves in the Roquefort region of France.”162  
The appellate court reasoned: 
A non-Indian maker of jewelry designed to look like 
jewelry made by Indians is free to advertise the similarity 
but if he uses the word “Indian” he must qualify the usage 
so that consumers aren’t confused and think they’re buying 
not only the kind of jewelry that Indians make, but jewelry 
that Indians in fact made.163 
The court held that there was no constitutional violation.164 
The Seventh Circuit also grappled with the potentially 
troubling fact that use of the term “Indian” in connection with faux 
Indian goods will not lead to consumer confusion in every case, 
and that the term will not be present in every instance where 
consumer confusion does exist.165  If a seller labels his goods “not 
Indian-made,” for instance, clearly no confusion exists, even 
though the word “Indian” is used.  Conversely, one can “falsely 
suggest” goods are Indian-made in a variety of ways other than 
overtly labeling goods “Indian” as Earth Dweller did.166  One may 
use the name of a tribe in connection with a good traditionally 
made by that tribe (i.e. Navajo Rugs, or Hopi Kachina Dolls).  One 
may advertise goods having a Southwest design as being 
“authentic” without qualification.  Additionally, using certain 
designs and motifs on the goods themselves, independent of any 
advertising or labeling, may be enough to confuse some non-
discerning consumers.  In the past, one vendor sold jewelry under 
the brand name “Indian Maid,” so that if consumers asked him if 
his goods were “Indian-made” he could truthfully respond 
“yes.”167  Another seller actually convinced a small village in the 
 
 162 Id. at 873–874 (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:91 (4th ed. 2004 supp.)). 
 163 Id. at 874. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See id. at 874–75. 
 166 Id. at 874–75 (“Perhaps the most natural meaning of ‘unqualified use of the term 
“Indian”’ or of the name of an Indian tribe is using the word or the name to denote an 
Indian product without including a disclaimer, such as ‘Indian style,’ or, more 
emphatically, if rather off-putting, ‘not manufactured by Indians.’”). 
 167 Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1043–44. 
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Philippines to change its name to “Zuni” so that when he built a 
factory there to create what he passed off as Indian goods, he could 
label them “Made in Zuni,” falsely suggesting such goods were 
made in the town of Zuni, New Mexico, which is inhabited by 
Indians of the Zuni tribe.168  Of course, in balancing policies of 
creative expression, fair business practices, and attempts to deter 
sellers of fraudulent goods, the IACA will not and should not 
forbid all manners of selling products which may confuse some 
consumers, just as the Lanham Act does not bar all brand names 
which may confuse some consumers as to a product’s source.169  
The Seventh Circuit limited its discussion to the narrow sliver of 
possible IACA violations involving the unqualified use of the term 
“Indian.”170  Thus, the court made no overbroad generalizations 
regarding other types of potentially violative actions by sellers and 
manufacturers that have not been challenged under the IACA.  The 
court also upheld the IACB’s authority to determine what an 
“Indian product,”171 and consequently, what an “Indian” is, thereby 
helping preserve tribal self-governance.172 
The court characterized the “unqualified use” provision as 
“policy that will guide [the Board] in deciding whether to refer 
matters to the Department of Justice for possible action.”173  The 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion concluded that even if the regulation did 
govern, it would be pertinent only in a case where there was no 
additional context to guide a consumer as to the nature of the 
product sold.174  In such a case, asking whether a defendant falsely 
suggested it was selling Indian products and asking whether it 
failed to qualify its use of the names of Indian tribes would be the 
 
 168 Id. at 1044. 
 169 See generally Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]here the plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate that a statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds the false 
belief allegedly communicated by the challenged advertisement, the plaintiff cannot 
establish that it suffered any injury as a result of the advertisement’s message.  Without 
injury there can be no claim, regardless of commercial context, prior advertising history, 
or audience sophistication.”). 
 170 See Waldron, 399 F.3d at 874–75. 
 171 Id. at 874. 
 172 See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 47. 
 173 Waldron, 399 F.3d at 875. 
 174 Id. 
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same thing.175  However, because there was “plenty of context” in 
the instant case, it was not just the use of the phrase “Indian” by 
the defendant that was responsible for creating consumer 
confusion.176  It was, rather, the entire sales package, including 
advertising, labeling, and place of sale, that violated the IACA by 
suggesting the goods in question were produced by Indians.177  In 
ruling that 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a) is intended to guide a court’s 
understanding of the IACA, rather than prescribe a method of 
determining whether consumers are likely to be confused, the court 
preserved a flexible measure for determining whether consumer 
confusion is likely to occur based on the facts and circumstances of 
a given case.178 
The significance of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion is two-fold.  
First, the analogy between trademark law and the IACA evidences 
how the court expects that representations of Indianness, when 
affixed to goods, operate in the minds of consumers.179  Second, 
the court’s recognition that the authority of the IACB to determine 
what constitutes an “Indian product” does not bestow upon the 
Board the power to determine what constitutes consumer 
confusion, helps define the role of the regulations in what is 
ultimately, as applied by the court, a trademark-like “consumer 
confusion” analysis.180  Such a rule helps maintain flexibility and 
thoughtfulness.  In any event, a rule that unqualified use of the 
term “Indian” affixed to goods creates consumer confusion as a 
matter of law, and thus constitutes an IACA violation, would be 
out of touch with the needs of advertisers and the realities of 
consumer perception in many instances.181  Supporting this 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 874. 
 179 Id. at 873–74. 
 180 Id. at 874. 
 181 The Court appeared sensitive to the difficult issue of what the “baseline” should be 
regarding what the term “falsely suggests” means to the average consumer: 
The instruction might have said that the name of a tribe suggests an Indian 
product unless the context rebuts the suggestion. But the difference between 
this formula and the statutory “falsely suggests,” which were it not for the 
regulation would allow a jury to award a verdict to a defendant even if the 
name of the tribe was not qualified, is probably too fine to sway a jury. 
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practical concern, the Lanham Act permits fair use of even the 
most protected trademarks by parties other than the trademark 
owner, for instance, in the context of informational advertising.182 
2. Native American Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance 
Co.183 
The second appellate court case to address a potential Indian 
Arts and Crafts Act violation was Native American Arts Inc. v. 
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.184  This case began in 2001 when 
Native American Arts, Inc. (“NAA”) sued Stravina Operating 
Company (“Stravina”) for a violation of the IACA.185  NAA 
alleged that Bloom Brothers and Artistic Impressions, two 
divisions of Stravina, manufactured and sold inauthentic Native 
American crafts and jewelry in violation of the IACA.186  NAA 
claimed that Stravina deceived the public and harmed legitimate 
Indian artisans by selling its products in a way that falsely 
suggested the products were Indian-made.187  Stravina asked its 
insurers, Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. (“Hartford”), to defend 
Stravina against NAA’s claims, but Hartford refused.188  NAA and 
Stravina settled the case, and as part of the settlement, Stravina 
assigned NAA its rights under the insurance policy.189  NAA 
subsequently brought an action against Hartford alleging that 
Hartford had breached its duty to defend Stravina in the original 
lawsuit.190 
 
Id. at 875. 
 182 See 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION & 
PRACTICE § 5.09[3] (2006 ed.) (“A trademark is not, after all, a right ‘in gross’ which is 
protectible in the abstract against any and all use by others irrespective of a lack of 
likelihood of confusion.  In these circumstances, the courts weigh the right of a business 
to inform the public through advertising against the right of the public to be free from 
deception and confusion, and draw a line between collateral, informational use of a 
competitor’s trademark and infringing use, i.e., that which causes likelihood of 
confusion.”). 
 183 435 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 184 See id. at 731. 
 185 Id. at 730. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 730–31. 
 188 Id. at 731. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
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The basis upon which Hartford had refused to defend Stravina 
in the lawsuit was that the policy did not obligate Hartford to 
defend Stravina against claims based on the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act.191  Hartford argued that an Indian Arts and Crafts Act 
violation fell under two distinct exceptions to the general rule of 
coverage for an “advertising injury” under the terms of the 
insurance policy.192  First, Hartford claimed that marking one’s 
goods as “Indian” did not constitute an advertisement because use 
of the word fell under a general exception for “the design, printed 
material, information or images contained in, on or upon the 
packaging or labeling of any goods or products.”193  Second, 
Hartford maintained that the violation NAA alleged was an 
“‘advertising injury’ arising out of [the] infringement of [a] 
trademark, trade name, service mark or other designation of origin 
or authenticity”194 or, more generally, an injury “[a]rising out of 
any violation of any intellectual property rights, such as patent, 
trade secret, trademark, trade name, service mark or other 
designation of origin or authenticity,”195 which sufficiently 
exempted Hartford from its duty to indemnify or defend.196 
The court rejected Hartford’s first defense, holding that 
Stravina’s violated the IACA not only by mislabeling goods but 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 732.  “Stravina’s policy read: ‘We will pay those sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “personal injury” or “advertising 
injury” to which this insurance applies.  We will have the right and duty to defend any 
“suit” seeking those damages.’” Id. (quoting Stravina’s insurance policy).  The policy 
defined “advertising injury” as: 
a. Oral or written publication of material in your “advertisement” that slanders 
or libels a person or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or 
services; 
b. Oral or written publication of material in your “advertisement” that violates a 
person’s right of privacy; 
c. Copying, in your “advertisement,” a person’s or organization’s “advertising 
idea” or style of “advertisement”; or 
d. Infringement of copyright, slogan, or title of any literary or artistic work, in 
your “advertisement.” 
Id. (quoting Stravina’s insurance policy). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 733 (quoting the policy providing Stravina’s insurance coverage from 1999 to 
2001). 
 195 Id. (quoting the policy providing Stravina’s insurance coverage from 2001 to 2003). 
 196 Id. 
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also through advertising activity and marketing methods, which 
included distributing misrepresentative catalogues and 
brochures.197  Since NAA’s advertisements stressed the 
authenticity of their goods, by falsely doing the same, Stravina’s 
advertisements copied NAA’s “style of advertisement,” which was 
covered under the policy.198  The court held that Stravina’s actions 
therefore constituted an “advertising injury” against which 
Hartford had a duty to defend.199 
The court, however, found Hartford’s second defense 
persuasive.200  While NAA attempted to argue that this exception 
applied narrowly to Lanham Act claims—and since NAA did not 
allege any Lanham Act complaints, neither the trademark nor the 
“origin or authenticity” exclusion applied201—the Court rejected 
this view.202  The court explained that applying the exceptions 
narrowly to trademark violations “would do serious violence” to 
the language of the policy.203  NAA’s allegations of false 
representations of “Indianness” fell squarely within the 
“designation of origin or authenticity” of Stravina’s products.204  
The court reasoned that alternatively, even if the exclusion from 
coverage was limited to traditional forms of intellectual property 
such as trademarks, NAA’s claim would still fail because of the 
IACA’s “trademark-like” qualities.205  The court thus affirmed 
Hartford’s motion for summary judgment.206 
The significance of this outcome is that it clarifies the court’s 
understanding of the IACA by forcing it to define what the IACA 
means.  When the court categorized the IACA as a trademark 
statute, it implied that one’s ability to call one’s self “Indian” is not 
so much an expression of culture as an advertisement of it; it is an 
asset one can use for commercial gain rather than a means of 
 
 197 Id. at 732–33. 
 198 Id. at 733. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 733–34. 
 201 Id. at 733. 
 202 Id. at 734. 
 203 Id. at 733. 
 204 Id. at 734. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 735. 
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establishing cultural identity.  The Court expressed this 
understanding when it opined that in misrepresenting its goods as 
Indian, Stravina “traded upon a reputation, history, and sales 
advantage that it did not deserve. . . . and took sales away from 
those whose heritage gives them the right to capitalize on the 
market value and goodwill associated with authentic, Native 
American-made products.”207 
The categorization of the IACA as a trademark law further 
indicates how Courts conceive the Act as functioning in practice.  
As in Waldron, the Hartford court recognized that contextual clues 
relating to the style of advertising, rather than sellers affixing 
“Indian” labels to the goods in question, are often responsible for 
causing consumer confusion over the authenticity of Indian 
goods.208  The Hartford court even referenced the Waldron case 
when it reaffirmed that as a functional matter, the IACA and its 
implementing regulation, 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a), make “Indian” a 
trademark denoting products made by Indians, and concurred that 
the Lanham Act ought to guide jurisprudential analysis of the 
IACA.209  By moving its focus on the Act from one questioning the 
labeling rights of artisans to one pondering how consumers will 
view labels of Indian authenticity, the court adopts a consumer-
focused analysis of the Act. 
The Waldron and Hartford courts demonstrate that the 
differences between trademark provisions and the IACA are 
dwindling in the minds of the judiciary.  But does this consumer-
driven analysis, indicating that judges interpret the IACA as 
intended to protect consumers rather than Indian communities, 
conflict with the initially expressed purpose of the Act as 
envisioned by Congress in 1935 and 1990?  The next part will 
discuss the two main reasons why the merging of these two areas 
of law, while convenient, may prove problematic. 
 
 207 Id. at 733.  For a discussion of this right to capitalize, see Brown, supra note 86, at 
194.  The Hartford court was not the first court to suggest that cultural groups possess an 
inherent property right in collective cultural innovations and creations.  See, e.g., Indrogo 
v. U.S. Army, 18 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27–28 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that individuals who 
have no ties to any Indian tribe lack standing to bring a claim for the repatriation of 
Native American remains). 
 208 Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733. 
 209 Id. at 734. 
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III. A CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ASSET 
A. A New Perspective: Why the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 
1990 is Not a Cultural Heritage Law 
In the sixteen years since Congress enacted the IACA, 
speculation that the goal of the Act was to preserve Indian cultural 
heritage has fueled most of the commentary on the statute.210  
Native American congressmen, after all, promoted the Act211 in 
response to an Indian outcry regarding the lack of enforcement of 
the 1935 version of the Act.212 
It is puzzling, then, that in recent litigation involving the Act, 
Courts have viewed IACA violations as analogous to trademark 
violations, ruling with a policy toward consumer protection from 
confusion, rather than Indian protection from the existence of 
fakes.213  Furthermore, the government markets the IACA as a 
“truth-in-advertising” law—the policies of which focus on 
protecting consumers rather than creators.214  Critics seem justified 
in criticizing the act for failing as a cultural heritage act: in 
practice, the IACA does not do an adequate job of protecting 
Indians—especially those in the Indian Gap—from 
misrepresentation at the hands of non-Indians, or in some cases, 
even at the hands of Indians outside of their tribe.215  Cultural 
misappropriation has not ceased, it has merely taken a less obvious 
form.  Perhaps critics are merely off beam regarding what the law 
is trying to accomplish.  Perhaps the purpose of the Act is not to 
protect cultural heritage, but rather to secure economic viability for 
 
 210 Hapiuk deems the IACA “‘a legal regime designed to ensure cultural survival.’” See, 
e.g., Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1044 (asserting one can construe the IACA as “a legal 
regime designed to ensure ‘cultural survival’”); Antonia De Meo, More Effective 
Protection for Native American Cultural Property Through Regulation of Export, 19 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 52 (1994) (classifying the IACA as a “cultural property” law). 
 211 Parsley, supra note 5, at 493 & nn.64–65. 
 212 See id. at 493 (citing To Expand the Powers of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board: 
Hearing on H.R. 2006 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong. 
65 (1989) (statement of Rep. Jon Kyl)). 
 213 See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733, Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 
871, 874 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 214 See 16 C.F.R. § 0.17 (2006); 25 C.F.R. § 309.7 (2006). 
 215 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1072–74. 
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an economically underdeveloped community.  In this case, an 
analysis based on the IACA’s failure to preserve cultural heritage 
by using an economic measure misses a fundamental principle. 
The Act itself is vague in its purpose.  The full title of the 
legislation that eventually became the Indian Arts and Crafts Act 
of 1990 reads, “[a]n [a]ct to expand the powers of the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Board, and for other purposes,”216 while the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000 bills itself as “[a]n [a]ct to 
improve the cause of action for misrepresentation of Indian arts 
and crafts.”217 
In light of the impetus for the 1935 Act and the explicit 
responsibilities given to the IACB,218 however, it seems that the 
preservation of cultural heritage, if any, that results from the Act is 
merely a byproduct of the Act’s original intent: to improve the 
economic status of Indian communities.219  One finds further 
evidence for this hypothesis when one considers the ease with 
which Congress could have crafted a cultural misrepresentation 
provision, and the legislative silence regarding inter-tribal 
misrepresentation.220 
If economic improvement is indeed the purpose of the Act, 
then it should come as no surprise that the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the Act are consumers of Indian goods and politically recognized 
Indians, while the Act leaves those in the Indian Gap only slightly 
 
 216 Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662, 4662 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)). 
 217 Pub. L. No. 106-497, 114 Stat. 2219, 2219 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 305e 
(2000)). 
 218 These responsibilities include “promoting the development of American Indian and 
Alaska Native arts and crafts, improving the economic status of members of Federally-
recognized tribes, and helping to establish and expand marketing opportunities for arts 
and crafts produced by American Indians and Alaska Natives.” Protection for Products of 
Indian Art and Craftsmanship, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,551, 54,551–52 (Oct. 21, 1996) 
(supplementary background information for regulations to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 
309). 
 219 Of course, it is impossible to have “authentic” goods without some culture to 
authenticate, but economic wellbeing and cultural wellbeing are not always exclusively 
synonymous. 
 220 For an example of inter-tribal misrepresentation, see Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1073–
74. 
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better off, if it assists them at all.221  It follows, then, that while the 
Act may not be fair to some because of its limited definition of 
Indianness, criticism of the Act’s failure to address further 
concerns that Native Americans have about their identity and its 
portrayal in society at large is unfair. 
Certainly, it may be a valid criticism that the Indian arts 
counterfeit problem should have been solved by means of a 
cultural heritage law, one that focused on preserving the heritage 
of Indians, which would have likely included an economic 
component.222  There is no doubt that the economic bolstering of 
Indians will in some way affect cultural change, no matter how one 
delineates what it takes to qualify as an Indian.223  Indians stuck in 
the Indian Gap are unlikely to find solace in this Act so long as the 
statutory definition of Indian remains rooted purely in politics; for 
as long as the Act precludes Indian Gap Indians from qualifying as 
Indians, they cannot benefit from the consumer protection 
restrictions the Act affords.224  Unaccounted for as either Indians 
or consumers, such Indians are not only arbitrary under the Act; 
they are invisible. 
B. Indian v. Knock-off: The Only Dichotomy? 
The prohibition against a non-enrolled artisan labeling his 
goods as Indian-made, coupled with consumer desire for 
expressive over nominal authenticity, results in a peculiar tension 
when it comes to goods made by artisans who fall into the Indian 
Gap.  Products made by this group are neither “Indian” in the sense 
of being made by an enrolled Indian nor knockoffs in the sense of 
being factory-made overseas.  The current binary conception of the 
IACA—under which a product is either Indian-made or 
counterfeit—treats products produced by Indians in the Indian Gap 
 
 221 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1013, 1028, 1056. 
 222 See id. at 1021–22. 
 223 Can one not conversely argue that laws everywhere have a cultural heritage aspect to 
them, though in most instances it is the majority culture’s preservation at stake? See id. at 
1059 (“Now to be sure, many ‘tribes,’ in both the ethnological and the political sense, had 
existed long before this articulation by the Supreme Court—and well before 1492.”). 
 224 See id. at 1013, 1056. 
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as counterfeit,225 despite the fact that in many circumstances 
consumers, based on their notions of “authenticity” and cultural 
heritage, would conceive of such wares as falling under the 
“Indian” category.226  Therefore, while consumers would likely 
want to purchase such goods, and such artisans would want to sell 
them, the rigid statutory terms of the IACA frustrate both 
parties.227 
One should also remember that not all enrolled Indians create 
goods that consumers would consider “authentic.”228  Thus, 
between the number of “fraudulent Indians” who the Act 
recognizes as members of Indian tribes, and the number of non-
enrolled individuals who identify themselves as Indians but cannot 
or will not seek recognition, the IACA proves to be both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive in terms of its classification of 
artisans capable or willing to create “authentic” Indian arts and 
crafts that consumers would be interested in purchasing.  The 
IACA takes a flat view of “Indianness” as an economic asset, and 
forgets that it has powerful identity importance to those individuals 
who use the term “Indian” to describe who they are.229  The United 
States needs a better solution to the counterfeit Indian goods 
problem.  The next part of this Note discusses necessary 
considerations for constructing such a better solution. 
IV.  THE PROBLEM WITH LEGAL ANALOGIES 
A. The Use of Intellectual Property Rights in Matters of Cultural 
Heritage 
Using the western notion of trademarks to solve what more 
conventional means likely should have already solved is not as 
radical an idea as one may think.  Over the course of the last few 
 
 225 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159; 25 U.S.C. § 305e; Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1013. 
 226 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1056. 
 227 See id. 
 228 See id. at 1074.  As demonstrated supra, the mere fact that a Native American creates 
goods does not verify he uses authentic materials or methods, or that his works are not 
culturally misrepresentative in other ways. 
 229 See id. at 1014, 1031–32. 
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decades, both attorneys and anthropologists have advocated using 
intellectual property rights to assist in preserving issues of cultural 
heritage for indigenous groups.230  In the international context, this 
has begun to prove successful.231  In the United States, however, 
using copyright and patent law to protect elements of cultural 
heritage remains a largely unproven practice because of the many 
practical implementation problems of such regimes.232 
1. Legal Analogy to Intellectual Property Regimes May Lead 
to Absurd Results in Cultural Heritage Contexts 
One of the problems with creating new areas of legal rights by 
analogy is that “they tend to impose a mature, elaborated system 
on what may well be an unformulated situation.”233  Existing legal 
regimes, specifically older ones, evolved over time according to a 
complex blend of considerations in an attempt to balance policy; 
fairness; practical and technological limitations on enforcement; 
historical or traditional practices; and impact on special interest 
groups.  Blindly applying an existing legal regime to solve a new 
legal problem—such as applying trademark law to cure the 
counterfeit Indian goods problem—therefore fails to account for 
 
 230 For a broad introduction, see, for example, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK (Tom Greaves ed., 1994).  For more in-depth 
studies, see, for example, Michael F. Brown, supra note 86; MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO 
OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003), or ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW (1998). 
 231 See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 262–63 (Austl.) 
(finding in favor of aboriginal artists in their copyright infringement suit against 
Australian manufacturers and retailers who used the artists’ folkloric designs on textiles). 
 232 Such practical problems abound.  The limited monopolies that copyright and patent 
law authorize conflict with proponents of cultural heritage protection, who seek unlimited 
temporal preservation. But see Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural 
Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 796 (2001) (“[I]ntellectual property law, through 
modification of its authorial and temporal limitations and creation of community-specific 
protections such as an ‘authenticity mark,’ has the potential to strike an equitable balance 
between source community rights and the public interest in cultural products.”).  
Additionally, the requirements of the American copyright and patent schemes that a work 
must be attributable to a single author who created the work or reduced an idea to 
practice at a specifically-defined moment in time ignore the fact that cultural creations 
are necessarily the product of the work of many authors or creators over an extended span 
of time. See id. at 795. 
 233 Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibilty of the Right of Publicity: Is 
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1127 (1980). 
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the considerations which significantly shaped the existing regime 
in the first place.  Such application may lead to at best 
unpredictable, and at worst unwanted, results. 
Specifically, using intellectual property regimes to remedy 
cultural heritage problems has not proven in practice to be the 
cure-all it may be in theory.  Michael F. Brown, a scholar who has 
written extensively on the subject of misapplication of intellectual 
property regimes in the cultural heritage context,234 observes: 
[T]he debate over intangible cultural property as it has been 
conducted by anthropologists, legal scholars, and 
indigenous activists has tended toward a polemical 
romanticism that produces memorable bumper-sticker 
slogans (“Give the natives their culture back!”) but little in 
the way of sober reflection on the difficult balancing act 
required to formulate policies that provide reasonable 
protection for minority populations while maintaining the 
flow of information essential to a liberal democracy.235 
Brown argues that such proposals to expand the notion of 
copyright to defend indigenous cultures “are often formed by 
romantic assumptions that ignore the broader crisis of intellectual 
property and the already imperiled status of the public domain.”236  
Brown instead posits that effective policies for thinking about 
indigenous cultural and intellectual property should come from 
ideas which are “not only ethically sound but also thoroughly 
grounded in the practical realities of cultural creativity, 
information storage and transfer, the fluidity of ethnic boundaries, 
and the limitations of the judicial process in developed and 
developing nations alike.”237 
2. Intellectual Property Rights Have Practical Application 
Limitations 
A second problem with attempting to fit questions of cultural 
heritage into existing intellectual property regimes is that this 
 
 234 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 86; BROWN, supra note 230. 
 235 Brown, supra note 86, at 195. 
 236 Id. at 193. 
 237 Id. at 195. 
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approach fails to adequately meet the needs of those who argue for 
absolute preservation of cultural heritage.238  Generally, such 
interest groups seek to retain eternal property over their crafts.239  
Intellectual property law, however, mandates that such rights must 
enter the public domain after the monopolies protecting these 
rights for a limited duration expire.240  Such limited monopolies 
serve only as means to an end: to provide incentive for invention 
and artistic creation.241  The United States Constitution grants 
Congress broad power to determine how long such limited 
monopolies may last.242  Thus, while ascribing to the “authors” of 
certain elements of cultural heritage the bundle of rights that 
accompanies intellectual property treatment at first glance appears 
to adequately protect such elements, once the limited monopoly 
protecting these rights under intellectual property law expires, the 
rights themselves effectively expire as well. 
That the IACA attempts to address a problem that is not solely 
cultural, but economic too, further distorts the balancing test.  
“Purely mercantile” cultural heritage conflicts, such as an 
agribusiness’ acquisition of native crop varieties for genetic 
engineering purposes,243 or the incorporation of indigenous graphic 
designs into consumer goods without permission,244 involve only a 
single issue: how the native population can seek a fair share of the 
profits.245  The counterfeit Indian goods problem, however, 
extends well beyond Indian efforts to obtain compensation for lost 
profits.  But the counterfeit Indian goods crisis can also be 
distinguished from other “purely cultural” native grievances, such 
as those against the commoditization or publication of sacred or 
secret symbols, ideas and motifs that westerners stole or otherwise 
 
 238 See id. at 197. 
 239 See id. 
 240 Id. at 196. 
 241 Id. at 195–96. 
 242 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–204 (2003) (holding that the Copyright 
Term Extension Act’s extension of existing copyrights for an additional twenty years did 
not exceed Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause). 
 243 See Brown, supra note 86, at 195.  For a more expansive discussion and examples, 
see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK (Tom 
Greaves ed., 1994). 
 244 See Brown, supra note 86, at 195. 
 245 See id. 
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misappropriated.246  Unlike the offended groups in such cases, 
Indian artisans adversely affected by counterfeit iterations of their 
goods do not seek a blanket prohibition on the sale of all Indian-
style arts and crafts, Indian arts and crafts of a certain type, or even 
goods bearing certain markings, but rather aim to proscribe the sale 
only of those goods which are counterfeit relative to their maker.247  
Because the counterfeit Indian goods crisis is neither a “purely 
mercantile” nor “purely cultural” problem, but falls somewhere in 
between, the United States needs an innovative solution that duly 
considers assumptions implicit in both models. 
3. Cultural Heritage Involves Forms and Notions not 
Contemplated by Traditional Intellectual Property Regimes 
The cultural offense counterfeit Indian goods pose typifies a 
third reason why the use of intellectual property regimes to protect 
aspects of cultural heritage is often problematic: while modern 
intellectual property law affords to creators rights only to a limited 
singular expression of an idea, or particular idea reduced to 
practice, expressions of “cultural heritage” encompass ideas and 
concepts for which modern intellectual property schemes do not 
provide.248 
Furthermore, fundamental differences between western and 
indigenous cultural perspectives concerning how freely 
information ought to flow—and to whom it should flow—pose a 
particular problem in protecting cultural heritage through 
intellectual property regimes.249  Situations involving native 
notions of sacredness highlight such concerns.  Indeed, the 
American value of championing free speech and invention, which 
justifies the implementation of intellectual property rights, is 
oftentimes diametrically opposed to the Native American 
 
 246 See id. (noting that such grievances are about obtaining a fair share of the profits). 
 247 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.9 (2006) (“A non-Indian can make and sell products in the style 
of Indian art or craft products . . . if the non-Indian or other seller does not falsely suggest 
to consumers that the products have been made by an Indian.”). 
 248 See Brown, supra note 86, at 197. 
 249 See id. at 198 n.11 (noting the “fundamental difference” between the Native 
American and Western cultural perspectives on encouraging inquiries regarding the 
unknown). 
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commitment to secrecy concerning sacred matters.250  Similarly, 
the current American system grants writings and inventions 
intellectual property protection because the law views such 
writings and inventions as non-rivalrous and non-exclusive.251  In 
contrast, native peoples often view sacred knowledge as “a limited 
good that cannot properly exist in several places at once.”252  
Brown explains this view, observing that “[r]eligious knowledge 
that resides in inappropriate places may find its power diminished 
or dangerously distorted, hence the common practice of 
compartmentalizing information in order to limit access to the 
inner meaning of religious symbols.”253  The misuse of a symbol 
imbued with inherent power therefore “is at least an affront to 
[believers’] dignity, at worst a dangerous form of blasphemy 
capable of unleashing a genuine misfortune.”254 
B. Trademarks: The Next Frontier in Indian Reform 
In light of current problems with the use of copyright and 
patent regimes to encourage cultural heritage preservation, could 
trademark law be the solution?  Or is the IACA merely the next 
chapter in a fruitless search for an intellectual property regime 
capable of addressing indigenous concerns?  The disparity between 
the policies behind the creation of trademark law and the creation 
of the IACA suggests that trademark law may not be the answer. 
Trademarks developed in response to the needs of consumers 
to differentiate between goods and assure a consistent level of 
quality.255  The government affords trademarks legal protection 
because of the numerous functions they serve in a competitive 
marketplace.256  Gilson on Trademark Protection and Practice cites 
six such functions: 
 
 250 See id. at 198. 
 251 See id. at 196. 
 252 Id. at 197. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 1 GILSON LALONDE ET AL., supra note 112, § 1.03[3][a].  It is curious then, that 
Congress enacted the IACA, a statute that gives trademark-like status to the term 
“Indian,” in response to a problem primarily plaguing producers. 
 256 See id. § 1.03[7][a]. 
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(a) designating the source or origin of a particular product 
or service; 
(b) denoting a particular standard of quality embodied in 
the product or service; 
(c) identifying a product or service and distinguishing it 
from the products or services of others; 
(d) symbolizing the good will of its owner and motivating 
consumers to purchase the trademarked product or service; 
(e) representing substantial advertising investment and 
being treated as a species of property; and 
(f) protecting the public from confusion and deception, 
insuring that consumers are able to purchase products or 
services it wants, and enabling courts to fashion a standard 
of acceptable business conduct.257 
In contrast, when one differentiates between goods that are 
Indian-made and non-Indian-made, one preserves only two of the 
aforementioned functions: identifying a product and distinguishing 
it from the products of others; and protecting the public from 
confusion and deception to ensure consumers that they are able to 
purchase the products they want. 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which forbids sellers from 
using “a false designation of origin, or any false description or 
representation” in connection with their goods, addresses such 
policies.258  The courts in the Waldron and Hartford cases 
similarly suggest that calling or labeling goods “Indian” is not 
simply a means of brand identification for consumers, but is a 
“false designation of origin” under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.259  
 
 257 Id. § 1.03[1]. 
 258 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses . . . any false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to 
be damaged by such act.”). 
 259 See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 733–34 (7th Cir. 
2006); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873–74 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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The Hartford court states that “[t]he purpose of the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act is to protect consumers and the makers of authentic 
Native American goods from false representations of a product’s 
‘origin or authenticity.’”260  The analogy the Waldron court coins 
likening the “Indian” mark to marks of geographic origin, such as 
“Roquefort” to denote a particular cheese made in France,261 serves 
as further evidence of courts interpreting IACA violations as § 
43(a) violations.262 
Both the Waldron and Hartford courts, however, overlook the 
unique implications of forbidding a non-enrolled artisan from 
using the term “Indian” to describe his product, under the logic that 
such a term is a “false designation of origin” when the seller is not 
an Indian under the Act.263  Where most suits brought under § 
43(a) involve sellers misrepresenting a quality of their goods, cases 
brought under the IACA question sellers misrepresenting a quality 
about themselves.264  The ability to label one’s goods as Indian is 
commercial in the sense that it allows a seller to advertise what he 
believes to be desirable about his product and also demand a 
greater price for his goods.  This narrow view of the purpose of 
labeling one’s goods “Indian,” however, ignores a problem of 
identity: any restriction a statute imposes on labeling goods Indian-
made that does not reference an external legal definition of who 
qualifies as “Indian” necessarily and implicitly restricts 
individuals’ freedom to call themselves “Indian.”  Courts should 
not overlook such an identity problem when interpreting and 
applying the IACA. 
1. False Designation of Indianness as a Lanham Act § 43(a) 
 
 260 Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733.  The court also references background information 
appended to a final rule of the IACB that deems the IACA “‘essentially a truth-in-
marketing law designed to prevent, through both civil and criminal sanctions, marketing 
of products in a manner that falsely suggests such products are produced by Indians when 
the products are not, in fact, made by an Indian as defined by the 1990 Act.’” Id. (quoting 
Protection of Products of Indian Art and Craftsmanship, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,164, 35,164 
(June 12, 2003) (supplementary background information for regulations to be codified at 
25 C.F.R. pt. 309)). 
 261 Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873–874. 
 262 See also Hartford, 435 F.3d at 734 (citing Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873–74). 
 263 See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733; Waldron, 399 F.3d at 874. 
 264 See, e.g., Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873. 
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Violation 
A case of false advertising under § 43(a) requires the 
following elements: 
(1) A false or misleading statement of fact about a product; 
(2) Such statement either deceived, or had the capacity to 
deceive a substantial segment of potential consumers; 
(3) The deception is material, in that it is likely to influence 
the consumer’s purchasing decision; 
(4) The product is in interstate commerce; and 
(5) The plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a 
result of the statement at issue.265 
Interestingly, the statute does not require the presence of 
fraudulent intent.266  Based on these factors, there are a number of 
reasons why one should be skeptical about applying § 43(a) 
reasoning to the counterfeit Indian goods problem. 
a) Can Notions of Self-Identity be “False”? 
With regard to the first element, individuals calling themselves 
“Indian” when they do not qualify as such under the IACA should 
not necessarily constitute a “false” statement, as such a designation 
may have cultural or ethnic significance in addition to political 
import.  “Essential to any claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act is a determination of whether the challenged statement is one 
of fact—actionable under section 43(a)—or one of general 
opinion—not actionable under section 43(a).”267  The Pizza Hut 
court explained that “a statement of fact is one that (1) admits of 
being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of empirical 
 
 265 See, e.g., Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s Int’l, 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1500 (5th Cir. 1990); Cooke 
Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 
1990)). 
 266 See, e.g., Alison M. Andrews, Note, Implied Misrepresentations in Advertisements 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act: American Home Products Corp. v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 47 ALB. L. REV. 97, 113–14 (1982). 
 267 Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at 495–96. 
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verification.”268  As discussed above, individuals proclaiming 
themselves to be “Indian” may be making false statements in one 
context—as in whether one is an “Indian” as defined under the 
Act—but not in another.269  Courts should therefore not 
automatically deem a non-enrolled individual’s unqualified use of 
the term “Indian” false and misleading for purposes of a false 
advertising statute.270 
Similarly, holding the practice of individuals labeling their 
goods “Indian” as potentially violative of § 43(a) implies that 
either (1) the fact that a product’s maker was an enrolled Indian is 
a quality of a good in itself; or (2) the Indian authenticity which 
such a class of persons could provide is a quality that can be 
quantified with empirical verification.  There is no reason, 
however, to presume there is any difference in the quality of goods 
made by “Indians” as opposed to “non-Indians,” since “Indian” 
goods do not possess common standards of quality,271 in terms of 
either craftsmanship272 or the elusive quality of “authenticity.”  As 
stated, authenticity is an inexact measure of an amorphous idea of 
culture that, for various reasons, statutes cannot deem capable of 
“empirical verification.”273 
 
 268 Id. at 496 (citing Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 
679 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 269 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 270 See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 271 ‘‘[T]he public ha[s] come to rely on the trademark primarily as representing a 
satisfactory level of product quality emanating from a common, though anonymous, 
source.” 1 GILSON LALONDE ET AL., supra note 112, § 1.03[3][a] (citing Frank Schechter, 
The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816–19 (1927)).  
Nothing in the IACA or in its definition of Indianness is capable of curbing variance 
among the quality levels of Indian-made products.  For a discussion on changing the 
quality of one’s product after one has established a trademark, see id. 
 272 It is ironic that one of the reasons Indians pushed for trademark-like protection of 
Indianness was because Indian-made goods—often handmade, or traditionally made—
were of better quality than the mass-produced fakes producers fabricated overseas using 
lower-quality materials and inferior means of production, since the “solution” of relying 
on a producer’s political affiliation guarantees neither that Indian producers will make 
high-quality goods, nor that non-affiliated artisans will produce wares of lesser quality 
than those Indians make.  In fact, leading authorities unsurprisingly estimate that “the 
quality of the fakes is getting ‘better’—that is, more authentic-looking and thus harder to 
detect. Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1043 (citing John Shiffman, $1 Billion Industry Reeling 
as Faux Crafts Flood Market, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 1998, at A2). 
 273 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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Furthermore, as a practical matter, the group of artisans the 
IACA authorizes to label their goods “Indian” is too varied to 
accurately designate a source of origin from such a mark.  Not all 
Indians live, work or originate from the same location.274  Not all 
Indians have experienced similar historical events or treatment at 
the hands of the government.275  Nor are “Indian” artisans 
incorporated or affiliated in some way that would make Indianness 
a useful designation of origin.  Even if “origin” in this context 
were to mean cultural, racial, ethnic or religious origin, ‘‘origin’’ 
in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act refers to geographic origin and origin 
of production or manufacture, and not authorship of a creative 
work.276  For the foregoing reasons, courts should not consider 
non-enrolled individuals who declare themselves and their goods 
“Indian” to be making false statements of fact about a product for 
the purposes of § 43(a). 
b) The Strict Liability Requirement 
Even if § 43(a) of the Lanham Act appropriately governs one’s 
status as an enrolled Indian under the Act, the IACA should allow 
Indian Gap Indians—who use the word “Indian” in its descriptive 
rather than legal sense—to employ the term.  Even if one reads 
most of the restrictions on advertisements under § 43(a) into the 
IACA, one should not include the current strict liability standard at 
work under regular § 43(a) violations. 
Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a defendant need not have 
had any intent to make a false or misleading representation, or 
evidence an intent to deceive consumers.277  This policy is a 
conscious deviation from the 1920 Trademark Act, from which § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act derives.278  Section 3 of the 1920 Act 
requires that sellers must make any false designation “willfully and 
 
 274 See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1063 (“Demographic changes . . . are altering the 
relationship that many Indians have with Indian tribes.). 
 275 See id. 1059 (noting that the federal government has created some tribes where none 
existed before, while on other occasions it has divided single tribes into multiple bands, 
and even terminated altogether). 
 276 1 GILSON LALONDE ET AL., supra note 112, § 1.03[3][b]. 
 277 See Andrews, supra note 266, at 114. 
 278 Gary S. Marx, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for 
False Advertising, 40 WASH & LEE L. REV. 383, 391 (1983). 
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with an intent to deceive.”279  This change in the Lanham Act—
which Congress created in 1946—evinces Congress’ desire to 
bring a broader class of misrepresentative commercial actions—
beyond the willful attempts of one seller to pass off her goods as 
those of another seller—under the ambit of statutory trademark 
protection.280  Since even unintentional misrepresentations are 
violations of § 43(a), damages allowable under the provision are 
limited to civil remedies, and not punitive damages.281 
The IACA is itself silent on the issue of intent.282  Because 
courts construe § 305e of the IACA as parallel and analogous to 
the Lanham Act, however, they impose strict liability for each 
“commercial transaction involving a ‘false suggestion’ that 
merchandise was manufactured by Indians,”283 and do not inquire 
into the intent of the defendant in cases brought under the IACA.284  
Nonetheless, there is evidence in the construction of the statute that 
an intent element should be a necessary precondition of liability 
under the IACA. 
First, in contrast to the exclusively civil remedies available 
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the IACA contains criminal 
provisions.285  The IACA further provides that courts may hold 
violators liable for treble damages, or up to $1,000 per day for the 
duration of the infraction, whichever is greater.286  Courts may also 
award punitive damages.  In other areas of American law, the 
government typically enacts strict liability statutes in limited 
circumstances only—when there is an unreasonable risk of 
harm287—that are not present in the field of the Indian goods trade. 
 
 279 Id. 
 280 Andrews, supra note 266, at 103. 
 281 Id. at 100–01 n.12. 
 282 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000).  See also Native Am. 
Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 283 Id. at 881–82 (N.D. Ill.1998).  See also Native Am. Arts, v. Earthdweller, Ltd., No. 
01 C 2370, 2002 WL 1173513, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2002) (“The IACA imposes strict 
liability for each IACA violation, regardless of [the defendant’s] intent.”). 
 284 See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, 2002 WL 1173513. 
 285 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2000) 
 286 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)–(b) (2000). 
 287 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand 
Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 323, 325 (1991). 
WOLTZ_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC 1/23/2007  4:40 PM 
2007 INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT 491 
Second—also in contrast to § 43(a)’s enhanced scope of 
liability, which broadens the ambit of the statute beyond actions in 
which sellers attempt to pass off their products as someone 
else’s—Congress enacted the IACA precisely to combat the 
problem of non-Indians passing their products off as “Indian.”288  
This suggests that Congress aimed for the IACA to punish 
fraudulent conduct, not simply eradicate all forms of consumer 
confusion.  It is thus unnecessary and overly restrictive for the 
IACA to utilize a similar strict liability measure of intent. 
C. It’s Just Too Personal: Why Lawmakers Should be Sensitive to 
Issues of Identity 
From a policy standpoint, perhaps the most important reason 
why § 43(a) is ill-suited to combat the problem of fake Indian 
crafts is because the form of “false designation of origin . . . or any 
false description or representation” used “in connection with”289 
the sale of Indian goods—like the IACA itself—has more than 
economic implications.  The ability to label one’s goods “Indian-
made” is not just a statement about the goods, but also about the 
producer.  While the text of § 43(a) is not definitive on the 
question of whether false representations must pertain  to a quality 
of the goods—versus a quality of the maker, such as Indianness—
no § 43(a) case currently appears to exist in which the ethnicity of 
the maker of a good is the relevant legal inquiry.  Section 43(a) 
cases focus on factual matters relating to qualities of the goods 
themselves—whether about ingredients used in making a particular 
product,290 the geographic region of a product’s manufacture,291 or 
 
 288 See Native Am. Arts, v. Earth Dweller, No. 01-C-2370, 2001 WL 910394, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2001) (“Non-Indian makers of such goods must not ‘pass off’ their 
products as ones made by Indians, Indian tribes or Indian arts and crafts organizations 
when they are not” (citing Ho-Chunk Nation v. J.C. Penney, No. 98 C 3924, 1999 WL 
1068700 at *4 (N.D Ill. Nov. 17, 1999))).  See also Barker, supra note 62, at 46–47 (“It’s 
all a matter of dollars and cents; that is why these impostors want to call themselves 
Indian.  But our motives are pure.  We are only interested in the good of Indian culture.”). 
 289 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125 (West 2006). 
 290 See generally Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s Int’l, 227 F.3d 489, 495–98 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 291 See generally Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 291, 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (“[A]nyone who makes sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese in the 
Community of Roquefort can call it ‘Roquefort.’  In the second place, anyone can make 
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otherwise whether a product is what it claims to be.292  In such 
cases, no likelihood exists for hurt feelings.  No personal attacks 
on individual identity are conceivable.  If a court finds that a 
producer violated § 43(a) because his cheese is not, as labeled, 
made in France, or because his pizza dough is not made with 
filtered water, the producer has a choice of whether to stop labeling 
his products as such, or instead alter his business practices to 
reflect his representations and make them true.  Artisans whom the 
IACA does not classify as Indians and who cannot seek tribal 
enrollment, however, have no similar recourse.  They cannot, 
through making new products, or using different methods of 
production, achieve the arbitrarily determined quality of Indianness 
as required under the IACA.  When Indianness becomes a 
commodity for sale in and of itself, sellers cease to exclusively sell 
goods and begin to sell themselves.  The result is a unique form of 
objectification and sale of the Indian—mostly by white 
consumers—that smacks of hypocrisy when the government touts 
the IACA as a law bent on increasing Indian sovereignty and social 
amelioration. 
The mere fact that Congress did not design the IACA primarily 
as a cultural heritage law293 does not mean that lawmakers should 
settle for a law that fails to account for what is a cultural heritage 
problem: individuals’ inability to call themselves what they believe 
they are.  When it comes to “economic” regulations that effectively 
tell American citizens which parts of their cultural identities—
especially the immutable parts—they can identify with, courts and 
legislatures should be especially sensitive to the possibility of 
cultural harm that could result.294  In the case of the IACA, the 
 
sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese and can market it under any name he sees fit except that if 
it is not made in the Community of Roquefort he may not call it ‘Roquefort Cheese.’”). 
 292 See generally Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F. 2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“The [orange juice] ad makes an explicit representation that Premium Pack is produced 
by squeezing oranges and pouring the freshly-squeezed juice directly into the carton.  
This is not a true representation of how the product is prepared.”). 
 293 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 1 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 
2123. 
 294 See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 6–7 (“[A]ny law, statutory or otherwise, that 
defines an ethnic group will have social implications beyond the narrow focus of the law, 
at least in the United States.  Federal Indian law . . . is assumed to have an even greater 
potential for social Impact.  Indian law calls out for anthropological treatment—not 
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marginalization of a significant portion of Indian Gap artisans 
easily outweighs any benefits that may arise from decreasing 
consumer confusion.  If the IACA cannot eradicate consumer 
confusion without marginalizing and offending huge numbers of 
potential contributors to the Indian art community, Congress 
should be willing to consider that perhaps no law at all is better 
than a bad one. 
V. IN NEED OF A SOLUTION 
A. Aligning Consumer and Indian Interest: A Game of 
Redefinition 
The first hurdle in implementing any effective solution lies in 
ensuring that given assumptions are consistent with the realities of 
the operating forum, and that one adequately accounts for such 
assumptions.  If Congress is to enact a solution that helps to 
preclude misguided consumers from purchasing fake Indian goods, 
consumers must be both aware of the IACA’s existence and 
genuinely confused about the origins of the goods they purchase.295 
Assuming consumers are in fact confused, the government 
must next determine which goods it will deem real and which it 
will consider counterfeit, as well as which consumers need this 
form of statutory protection.  Under the IACA, “non-authentic” 
and “Indian” are mutually exclusive terms: artisans who are 
politically Indian produce authentic products, while non-politically 
Indian artisans cannot.296  As demonstrated above, this model is 
flawed.  Similarly, if consumers are aware of the disparity between 
 
because it deals with American Indians, but because it exists solely to maintain and 
enhance (and sometimes destroy) their social and political existence as peoples separate 
from the dominant society of the United States.”). 
 295 In the fashion industry, consumers intentionally purchase knock-off jewelry, 
handbags, and clothing every day because such ersatz goods are less expensive than their 
genuine counterparts. See generally Amendolara, supra note 2.  Is it not thus 
unreasonable to question the extent to which consumer confusion actually plays a role in 
the number of counterfeit items sold?  Since consumers intentionally purchase counterfeit 
goods regardless of the labels such goods bear, a statute like the IACA likely has no 
effect on consumer purchasing patterns. 
 296 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000). 
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their notions of “Indianness/authenticity” and the IACA’s notions 
of “Indianness/authenticity,” they may begin to disregard such 
labels all together—if they do not do so already—thereby 
rendering the Act meaningless.  Since the current system of tribal 
enrollment fails to adequately comport with consumer notions of 
the groups capable of making “authentic” Indian goods, and 
therefore risks consumer disregard of the entire statutory scheme, 
the current labeling regime must change. 
1. Redefining Indianness 
One solution would be for Congress to modify the IACA’s 
definition of Indian while allowing the Act to function the way it 
does now, thereby permitting the newly defined “Indians” to label 
their goods as “Indian-made.” 
Since the IACA does not bar manufacturers from producing 
“look-a-like” goods, but rather merely regulates how sellers label 
and market such wares, the Act places a great deal of faith in the 
ability of consumers to choose the “correct” good.297  This model 
implicitly hopes that market forces rather than legal means will be 
effective in driving counterfeit Indian goods from the marketplace.  
If the Act relies on consumers’ purchasing patterns to drive sellers 
of fake goods from the market, the Act’s definition of what is 
“real” and what is not must comport with consumer desires, or else 
a model based on consumer choice is bound to prove ineffectual. 
While such a solution sounds ideal in theory, the logistics of 
such a system would prove as problematic as the current system of 
delineation.  These logistical difficulties are most evident if one 
divides the current artisan population and their goods as sellers and 
presently market them into a matrix involving quadrants as 
follows: (1) enrolled authentic—the party traditionally aggrieved 
by knockoffs; (2) enrolled and inauthentic—artists such as the 
 
 297 Leaving the extinction of fake Indian goods in the hands of consumers begs a 
normative question as well as a practical one: is consumer awareness of and desire for 
goods which are “Indian” and “authentic” even something to be encouraged?  Or does it 
simply promote fetishism and quaint notions of traditionalism that are better off 
eradicated?  In an age that seeks ever-increasing racial and ethnic equality and tolerance, 
one could argue that encouraging such a stagnant view of Indian culture is detrimental to 
this goal. 
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Navajo producers who make the inauthentic kachina dolls; (3) non-
enrolled and authentic—representing the Indian Gap; and (4) non-
enrolled and inauthentic—artisans who either have no cognizable 
basis for calling themselves Indian and/or are not misrepresenting 
their goods as Indian-made.298  The current IACA allows only 
Indians in quadrants one and two to label their products as “Indian-
made” and bars artisans in quadrants three and four from making 
use of such labels.299  At its crux, the aim of drawing a new Indian 
line would be to reclassify Indian Gap Indians300 alongside the 
Indians the IACA currently protects, thereby merely adding 
quadrant three to quadrants one and two.301  Such a redefinition, 
however, fails to account for the fraudulent practices of the artisans 
in quadrant two.  Consequently, some marketing practices would 
likely continue to confuse consumers, and some Indian traditions 
would still risk misrepresentation without recourse.  An ideal law 
would protect the artisans in quadrants one and three while 
excluding those in quadrants two and four.302  Such a change 
would eliminate the under/over-inclusiveness problem that plagues 
the current IACA and other laws that use a political yardstick to 
measure Indianness. 
 
 298  
(1) Enrolled Authentic (2) Enrolled Inauthentic 
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic (4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic 
 
 299 Shaded areas represent categories of people covered under the current IACA 
categorization of “Indian.” 
(1) Enrolled Authentic (2) Enrolled Inauthentic 
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic (4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic 
 
 300 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 301 Shaded areas represent categories of people covered under a hypothetical alteration 
to the IACA’s current categorization of “Indian.” 
(1) Enrolled Authentic (2) Enrolled Inauthentic 
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic (4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic 
 
 302 Shaded areas represent the groups of people covered under an ideal formulation of 
“Indian” for purposes of the IACA as the statute presently exists. 
(1) Enrolled Authentic (2) Enrolled Inauthentic 
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic (4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic 
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However, absorbing Indian Gap Indians into the Indian 
category is not an easy task.  There is no objective way for one to 
determine which individuals fall into the Indian Gap without 
resorting to a method as arbitrary as the tribal enrollment 
process303 because queries of whether an Indian fits within the Gap 
fail to account for change over time and generations.  Supporting 
this contention, Gail Sheffield maintains that “[e]ven the most 
cleverly drawn definition [of Indian status] will not conform 
exactly to social reality in a world of fluid social and ethnic 
boundaries.”304  One should thus greet any effort to redefine 
Indianness with repugnance.  From a societal stand point, 
“hairsplitting between and among Indian people that is invited by 
efforts to legislate Indianness is both divisive and 
counterproductive.”305  Additionally, lawmakers should be wary of 
redefining Indianness in any way that would infringe on the 
sovereignty of individual Native American tribes to determine who 
their members are.306 
2. Redefining Authenticity 
A second, and perhaps better solution, is for the government to 
implement a new regime that focuses on the nature of the work 
created and hence, the product’s independent “authenticity,” 
regardless of the artist’s political affiliation.  A false advertising 
statute based on the relationship between an artist and his work, 
rather than on an artist’s political demarcation could entirely avoid 
inconsistencies regarding an individual’s relationship to a tribe or a 
tribe’s relationship to the U.S. Government, either of which may 
not recognize the artisan as an “Indian.”  Furthermore, such a 
system does not risk encroaching upon tribal autonomy. 
 
 303 SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 4. 
 304 Id. at 4. 
 305 Id. at 28. 
 306 Every federally-recognized Indian tribe possesses a basic power as sovereign entity 
to determine the makeup of its own membership.  The Supreme Court recognized this 
power in 1897. See Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897).  Stripping Indian tribes of 
such an elemental right would contradict the overriding policy of self-determination and 
increased tribal government that has been a hallmark of Indian policy since 1965. See 
SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 45. 
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Congress could avert the problems associated with determining 
which individuals qualify as “Indian” while still proscribing the 
sale of fake goods to unknowing consumers by changing the 
inquiry of the IACA from a question of whether consumers would 
incorrectly believe a product’s maker is an enrolled Indian, to one 
of whether the consumer would incorrectly believe the product is 
authentic to its maker either culturally, spiritually, traditionally, or 
by some other measure.  Under such a conception, wares artisans 
make with inauthentic materials—as is the case in many instances 
of intertribal misappropriation, against which the current Act fails 
to protect—and goods manufacturers mass produce in overseas 
factories could not bear “Indian-made” labels.  Such a revised 
scheme, however, would not preclude an artisan from labeling his 
products as “Indian-made” simply because he failed to qualify for 
tribal enrollment.  When the government’s belief in an artist’s 
Indianness and the artist’s belief in his own Indianness conflict, the 
latter, rather than the former, will likely satisfy consumers’ hunger 
for authenticity.  Thus, tribal status should be irrelevant, so long as 
the artist crafting the goods believes his self-identification as an 
Indian imbues his wares with meaning stemming from his 
Indianness. 
While this system is not perfect, the policies of heightened 
ownership of one’s identity and increased creativity and invention 
this reformulation furthers are not small, easily-discarded 
considerations.  Any modification of the current system must in 
some way focus on the goods rather than on the ethnicity of their 
makers, so as to depersonalize the inquiry—if any—that relates to 
whatever quality “Indianness” correlates to in both consumers’ and 
Indians’ minds. 
A solution that refocuses the “Indian” question away from 
tribal recognition may not be completely out of line with the goals 
of the IACA, because Indian Gap Indians may comprise part of the 
group of Indians Congress intended the Act to help in the first 
place.  From its genesis in 1935, the goal of the Act was to help 
Indian communities, and even in 1935 enrolled Indians did not 
constitute the entirety of such communities. 
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3. Requiring Intent to Deceive 
A third solution would be for Congress to alter the way 
authorities enforce the IACA by premising accountability under 
the statute on intent rather than strict liability.  Congress could 
fulfill this aim by implementing  a requirement wherein a plaintiff 
who sues under the IACA must demonstrate that a seller acted with 
the intent to “falsely suggest” mislabeled goods were Indian-made 
in order to prevail under the statute.  Such a solution would be 
relatively easy to enforce, would not require altering the definition 
of Indian or authenticity, and would be in keeping with the 
legislative intent of the Act.307  Such a policy would, furthermore, 
protect innocent artisans who in no way mean to “falsely suggest” 
their goods are Indian-made against careless purchasers.  Such an 
enforcement mechanism would encourage informed and careful 
shopping, benefiting the consumers most likely to care about 
artisans and the craftsmanship of their goods.  Elimination of the 
strict liability element would distinguish an IACA cause of action 
from regular false advertising or truth-in-advertising laws, to 
which Indian and non-Indian goods alike remain subject. 
B. Additional Efforts 
Artisans themselves are also employing less legalistic 
alternatives to help curb the proliferation of counterfeit goods 
sales.  Certification programs, for instance, such as the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Association’s logo effort308 and the Made in Alaska309 
program—of which artisans are making increasing use—help to 
heighten consumer awareness of the existence of fakes and 
encourage consumers to be vigilant when making purchases.  Such 
initiatives educate consumers about the prevalence of Indian fakes 
in particular and the negative repercussions of such goods.  As 
consumers become increasingly aware of such programs, they may 
change their purchasing patterns, bolstering sales of “real” Indian 
goods—however the government defines them—and decreasing 
 
 307 See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 308 See The Indian Arts & Crafts Association, About Us, http://www.iaca.com/?page 
=about (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). 
 309 Alaska Division of Community Advocacy, Made in Alaska Program, 
http://www.dced.state.ak.us/dca/mia/home.htm (last visited Oct 23, 2006). 
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instances of consumer confusion, thereby fulfilling the aims of the 
IACA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The controversy surrounding which individuals may refer to 
themselves as Indians under the Indian Arts and Crafts Act is just 
one example of the problems that can occur when race and the law 
mix.  Marlon B. Ross, a writer and scholar on the subject of race 
and identity politics, aptly notes that as a historical view of racism 
in America demonstrates: 
Race marks categories that determine who is legally 
allowed and culturally endowed to hold certain kinds of 
property. . . .  [I]t is also a category that marks the bonds 
and bounds of property itself; that is, who gets included and 
excluded from the right to determine the value of 
intellectual properties of others.310 
Ross illustrates this point by quoting Albion W. Tourgée, lead 
counsel for Plessy in Plessy v. Ferguson,311 the 1896 case that 
challenged “separate but equal” treatment of African Americans: 
Six-sevenths of the population is white.  Nineteen-
twentieths of the property of the country is owned by white 
people. . . .  Under these conditions, is it possible to 
conclude that the reputation of being white is not property?  
Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being 
the master-key that unlocks the golden door of 
opportunity?312 
Brownell agrees, definitively stating that “[a]s long as race is 
the basis of the government’s definition of Indian, self 
determination will not be.”313  In the context of Indian arts, then, 
 
 310 Marlon B. Ross, The New Negro Displayed: Self-Ownership, Proprietary 
Sites/Sights, and the Bonds/Bounds of Race, in CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE 
BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 259 
(Elazar Barkan ed., 2002). 
 311 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 312 Id. 
 313 Brownell, supra note 57, at 317. 
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the problem with any governmental definition of Indian status lies 
not so much in the substantive definition of Indianness the 
government employs, but rather in who creates such a definition 
and from where it originates.  If Congress implements a new 
enforcement system for properly identifying authenticity that does 
not hinge on any definition of Indianness, it could well avoid 
difficult issues of sovereignty, government intrusion, and 
individual identity. 
 
